

**State of Colorado  
Department of State**

**ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**Mike Coffman**  
**SECRETARY OF STATE**  
**February 26, 2007**

---

**2006 GENERAL ELECTION:**

**FINDINGS OF THE MONTROSE COUNTY GENERAL ELECTION INVESTIGATION**

---

INDEX

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... 4

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND..... 4

JURISDICTION ..... 5

ISSUES RAISED BY THE COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE..... 5

FINDINGS OF FACT..... 6

LEGAL AUTHORITY..... 10

INVESTIGATION OF THE MONTROSE COUNTY 2006 GENERAL ELECTION ..... 11

CONCLUSION ..... 15

RECOMMENDATIONS..... 20

## LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1	Montrose County Canvass Certification
Attachment 2	Hand Totaled Canvass Results
Attachment 3	Amendments to Write-In Candidate Totals
Attachment 4	Amendment to Official Results
Attachment 5	Request for Security Plan dated October 4, 2006
Attachment 6	Delinquent Security Plan Follow-up E-mail dated October 23, 2006
Attachment 7	Security Plan Submission dated October 26, 2006 – 13 Pages Received
Attachment 8	E-mail from Debbie Rudy Indicating Completion/Submission of Security Plan date October 26, 2006
Attachment 9	Incomplete Notice A1 dated October 29, 2006
Attachment 10	Incomplete Notice B1 dated November 4, 2006
Attachment 11	Inventory Documentation received November 6, 2006
Attachment 12	Request for Documentation and Montrose County Response dated November 16, 2006
Attachment 13	Voting System Security – Incident Report
Attachment 14	Incomplete Notice C1 dated December 16, 2006
Attachment 15	E-mail Reply to Incomplete Notice C1 from Carol Kruse dated December 18, 2006
Attachment 16	Letter to Carol Kruse dated December 27, 2006 Requesting Information
Attachment 17	Response from Carol Kruse dated January 4, 2007
Attachment 18	MBB Content Screen Shots
Attachment 19	Polling Location CCC – Oath of Judges/Registration Verification/Certification
Attachment 20	Polling Location FH – Oath of Judges/Registration Verification/Certification
Attachment 21	Polling Location DMEA – Registration Verification/Certification
Attachment 22	Polling Location NHF – Oath of Judges/Registration Verification/Certification
Attachment 23	Polling Location PAV – Oath of Judges/Registration Verification/Certification
Attachment 24	Secretary of State Chain of Custody Logs
Attachment 25	Photo Documentation of Sealed VVPAT, Incomplete Chain of Custody Logs, Direct Record Equipment, Other Findings, Canvass Documentation, Unsecured Tally Computer, Mobile Ballot Box Cards, Various Security Breeches





February 26, 2007

### **Executive Summary**

On December 16, 2006, after identifying several possible problems associated with the 2006 General Election in Montrose County, the Colorado Secretary of State concluded that the conduct associated with the Montrose County election needed to be reviewed. The decision was made based upon observations of the Secretary of State observer present in Montrose County on Election Day; discussions between Department of State staff and the Montrose County Clerk and Recorder and the Montrose County Elections Supervisor; and the convening of the Montrose Elections Fact Finding Task Force.

The investigation conducted by the Secretary of State revealed numerous and substantial problems related to the conduct of the 2006 General Election in Montrose County. The Secretary of State staff identified errors in the programming of voting machines; failure to conduct Logic and Accuracy Testing; failure to submit the required security plan; failure to secure voting equipment and election records as required by law; inconsistencies in the recording of voter information in the pollbooks; signature cards unaccounted for from Early Voting and Election Day; and a single point of knowledge in the elections supervisor.

During the investigation, the Secretary of State found no evidence of fraud or criminal misconduct by any person involved in the Montrose County 2006 General Election.

The Secretary of State recommends that appropriate changes to staffing, security, training, and document organization be addressed immediately. The Secretary of State reserves the right to monitor Montrose County through all upcoming elections to ensure that appropriate steps have been taken. Should the same pattern of issues continue, or arise again, the Secretary has the ability to seek judicial authority as provided by Colorado law to take over control of future elections.

### **Procedural Background**

Prior to Election Day, November 7, 2006, the Office of the Secretary of State ("Office") received a request from Montrose County Clerk and Recorder Carol Kruse for an election observer registered as a Democrat. The Office honored the request by sending Rita Thaumert (Administrative Assistant) as an observer.



Ms. Thiemert subsequently provided a written report to John Gardner, Voting Systems Specialist, documenting her observations on Election Day. Thereafter a panel was convened by residents of the county to assess problems which occurred on Election Day. Mr. Gardner and Tim Bishop, Voting Systems Technician, were asked to provide testimony during one of the panel meetings which ultimately brought to light additional issues which the Office was not previously aware.

These additional issues prompted an investigation into the policies and procedures of the Montrose County Clerk and Recorder's ("Clerk") Office pursuant to § 1-1-107(2)(b), C.R.S. Contained herein are the details of the events leading to the investigation and the findings of the investigation.

### **Jurisdiction**

Jurisdiction of the Office of Secretary of State is vested pursuant to § 1-1-107(2)(b), C.R.S., which specifically authorizes the Secretary of State to review the practices and procedures of elections in Colorado; therefore the Secretary of State has authority to review the procedures in the County Clerk and Recorder of Montrose County office, its employees and other election officials in the conduct of an election. Further, this Office is empowered to exercise any other powers or perform any other duties that are consistent with Article 1.5 of Title 1, C.R.S., and that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration, implementation, and enforcement of the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA")<sup>1</sup> and that will improve the conduct of elections in the state in conformity with HAVA.<sup>2</sup>

### **Issues Raised by the Colorado Secretary of State**

Upon reviewing phone logs, the Election Day observers' report and conversations between Mr. Gardner and the Montrose County elections staff, the following issues were raised:

- (1) Why were there programming issues prior to and during Early Voting and the General Election?
- (2) How many databases were used by the county for the purposes of recording and tallying the results?
- (3) Were all votes cast counted? Do the canvass totals balance?
- (4) Why were the machines used in the 2006 Primary Election not reset prior to their use in the 2006 General Election?
- (5) Why did the county fail to conduct Logic and Accuracy Testing ("LAT")?
- (6) Why did the county not submit the required Montrose County Security Plan ("Security Plan") by the deadline?
- (7) Are there adequate security measures in place?
- (8) Why were there issues with the wrong ballot style being sent to voters?

---

<sup>1</sup> 42 U.S.C. 15512, et seq., (2002).

<sup>2</sup> See § 1-1.5-104(1)(f), C.R.S.

(9) Why was the division of duties set up to allow for a Single Point Failure?

### **Findings of Fact**

#### *October 4, 2006 – Security Plan Notification*

The Office issued letters to all counties informing them of the change in security requirements pursuant to the ruling of Judge Manzanaras of Denver District Court. Each county was notified of the new standards and the requirement to submit a new County Security Plan no later than October 20, 2006.

Included in the letter to the Clerk was a “Security Plan Status for Montrose County” detailing the items to be addressed by the county.

#### *October 17, 2006 – Telephone Conversation with Kathryn Mikeworth*

Debbie Rudy, Montrose County Elections Supervisor, called the Office and spoke with Kathryn Mikeworth, Ballot Access Lead. Ms. Rudy notified Ms. Mikeworth that six (6) ballots were sent to voters with an extra race on the ballot which voters were not eligible to vote on. The decision was made to duplicate the ballots, so as to exclude the erroneous race, upon the return of the voted ballot.

Ms. Rudy also spoke with Ms. Mikeworth about 28 ballots sent out to voters that were missing one question. The determination was made that Ms. Rudy should send an additional ballot containing only the missing question with instructions as to how to proceed. Additionally, Ms. Rudy was informed that the Clerk’s staff may be required to hand count the ballots when returned.

#### *October 23, 2006 – Write-In Malfunction on DRE*

Ms. Rudy contacted Wayne Munster, Deputy Director of Elections, to notify him that she was having issues with the write-in candidate function on the Direct Record Electronic Voting (“DRE”) machine. Ms. Rudy worked with Hart InterCivic (“Hart”) to determine the problem; the machines were then re-programmed and tested.

Ms. Rudy also contacted Mr. Gardner explaining that the write-in function was not appearing on the DREs. One of the Early Voting sites was inoperable for approximately four (4) hours, requiring voters to use paper ballots to cast their vote. Ms. Rudy created a new Hart database and reprogrammed all machines not displaying the write-in candidate option.

Mr. Gardner and Ms. Rudy also spoke about error messages appearing on some of the DREs being used for Early Voting. The two determined that the problem was due to the failure to reset those machines after the 2006 Primary Election in preparation for the 2006 General Election. Mr. Gardner questioned Ms. Rudy as to why the machines had not been reset; he learned that



Montrose County had not conducted its LAT as required by law.<sup>3</sup> The failure to reset the machines would have been found prior to Early Voting had the LAT been conducted. Mr. Gardner, via telephone, assisted with the reprogramming of the software and supplied Ms. Rudy with explicit instructions on resetting the machines and conducting the Hardware Diagnostics Test. Mr. Gardner noted that Montrose would now have three (3) databases to reconcile on Election night.

*October 26, 2007 – Montrose County Security Plan Submitted*

Ms. Rudy sent, via facsimile, the Security Plan as required by order of the Denver District Court. The Office received thirteen (13) of the stated 26 pages. Mr. Gardner reviewed the received documentation and responded with an “Incomplete Notice A1” on October 29, 2006.

*October 29, 2006 – “Incomplete Notice A1”*

Mr. Gardner sent an “Incomplete Notice A1”, via e-mail, to Ms. Kruse notifying her of items that were complete on her submitted Security Plan as well as items in need of further clarification. Ms. Kruse was given until the close of business on November 1, 2006 to submit the requested information.

*October 30, 2006 – Telephone Conversation with Kathryn Mikeworth and Hilary Rudy*

Ms. Rudy notified Ms. Mikeworth and Hilary Rudy, Legal Specialist, that five (5) incorrect ballot styles were provided to voters at an Early Voting site. The ballots were missing two (2) questions. The decision was made that a separate ballot with the two (2) missing questions would be provided to the voters.

*November 1, 2006 – Telephone Conversation with Kathryn Mikeworth*

Ms. Rudy notified Ms. Mikeworth that duplicate ballot packets were sent to voters. The decision was made that the Clerk’s office would hold the ballots of those affected until the close of polls on Election Day then count the ballots so long as the voter only returned one of the two ballots sent.

*November 3, 2006 – Internal E-mail*

Theresa Holst, Temporary Employee at the Department of State, provided Mr. Gardner, via e-mail, with an update on the status of requested information related to Montrose County. The e-mail stated:

Debbie needs help regarding her Security plan. I told her to contact you or Tim and you would help her through it. Said she would when she “gets a chance” could be Monday.

---

<sup>3</sup> Secretary of State Rule 11



Inventory: She will fax to SOS tonight 11/3/06

Election Set up File: Mailed 10-31-06

*November 4, 2006 – “ Incomplete Notice B1”*

Mr. Gardner sent an “Incomplete Notice B1” dated November 3, 2006, via e-mail, to Ms. Kruse notifying her of items that were complete on her submitted Security Plan as well as items in need of further clarification. Ms. Kruse was asked to submit the information as soon as possible noting that the Office records indicated that she had yet to respond to the previous request.

*November 7, 2006 – Election Day Observers Report/Communication with the Office*

Ms. Thaemert arrived at the Clerk’s office at 6:20 a.m. on Election Day. Ms. Thaemert reports that at 7:00 a.m., the opening of the polls, the Clerk’s office was notified that the Valley Baptist polling location was experiencing problems with the voting equipment. A representative from Hart was dispatched to the Valley Baptist polling location, where Ms. Rudy was waiting, to assess the situation. While the equipment was being assessed, voters were asked to go to the Montrose County Courthouse (“Courthouse”) to cast their vote. The staff utilized Ballot Now to print the appropriate ballot; this caused additional delays for voters. At approximately 11:00 a.m. the equipment was operational and ready for use by the voters; the issue was rectified by a citizen who noticed that the connection of a cord was incorrect.

The Clerk’s office was also notified that the voting equipment at Friendship Hall was not working. Again, the voters were requested to go to the Courthouse to cast their vote. By early afternoon the Hart representative and Ms. Rudy once again had the equipment functioning.

The voting machines at the Pavilions polling location also ceased working sometime mid-afternoon. Ms. Rudy and the representative from Hart attempted to get the machines operational again, however at least four (4) of the machines remained inoperable for the remainder of Election Day, although eight (8) other machines were operable. While the machines were inoperable, voters were once again sent to the Courthouse to vote. The voters that remained at the Pavilions location were provided with paper ballots; when those ran out voters were given sample ballots.

Ms. Thaemert reported that Ms. Rudy was not present in the Clerk’s office much of Election Day and that the staff was not certain as to her whereabouts or the source of the equipment failures. At approximately 9:00 p.m. Ms. Rudy reported that the source of the problems was not a mechanical issue but rather operator error.

Teams of election workers duplicated more than 350 sample ballots voted on at the Pavilions polling location and finished duplication around 3:45 a.m. At that time, about 900 of the approximately 6800 ballots had been scanned.

*November 20, 2006 – Request from the Montrose Elections Fact Finding Task Force/Receipt of Records*

The Montrose Elections Fact Finding Task Force (“Task Force”) contacted Mr. Gardner requesting his presence at the December 14, 2006 meeting. Mr. Gardner was asked to prepare a presentation on issues related to the 2006 General Election in Montrose, and more specifically those involving the Hart Voting System.

Mr. Bishop notified the Clerk that the Office had received the election setup records. As previously stated in the e-mail from Ms. Holst to Mr. Gardner, Ms. Rudy notified the Office on November 3, 2006 that said records had been mailed on October 31, 2006.

*December 14, 2006 – Meeting with County Clerk/Montrose Elections Task Force Meeting*

Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop traveled to Montrose to appear at the Task Force meeting on behalf of the Secretary of State. Prior to the meeting with the Task Force, Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop met with Ms. Kruse and Ms. Rudy.

Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop spoke with Ms. Kruse, Ms. Rudy, and the elections staff for approximately 15 minutes. The Clerk’s staff was primarily interested in the information that would be presented to the Task Force. The group discussed the fact that the Security Plan was still not complete as well as problems associated with Election Day. Ms. Rudy commented that the county had experienced only a few small problems associated with the election, and she felt as though they were unfairly being “picked on”. She then asked Mr. Gardner if any other counties had experienced delays in voting or other problems on Election Day. In speaking further with the Clerk’s staff, Mr. Gardner was alerted to the fact that the number of voting databases used in the election was two more than had been provided to the Secretary of State by the Clerk.

At the Task Force meeting, Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop addressed issues presented to the Office leading up to and including Election Day by Montrose election staff. Additionally, the two answered questions posed by members of the Task Force.

*December 15, 2006 – Internal Discussion*

Upon returning to the office, Mr. Gardner spoke with Mr. Munster and Stephanie Cegielski, Legal Specialist, regarding the meeting. A determination was made that the Secretary of State should be made aware of the scope of the problems discovered regarding Montrose County.

*December 16, 2006 – “Incomplete Notice C1”*

Mr. Gardner sent an “Incomplete Notice C1”, via e-mail, to Ms. Kruse notifying her of items that were complete on her submitted Security Plan as well as items in need of further clarification. Ms. Kruse was notified that Montrose County was out of compliance and asked to submit the information as soon as possible.



Mr. Kruse responded to Mr. Gardner's e-mail stating that "[w]e are currently finishing up the elements that were deficient. You will receive it this week."

*December 19, 2006 – Internal Meeting*

The Secretary instructed Ms. Cegielski to draft a letter requesting information from County Clerk & Recorder Carol Kruse related to Election Day. The information was to be used to conduct an investigation. The letter, dated December 27, 2006, was written by Ms. Cegielski and signed by Holly Lowder, Director of Elections. The letter was provided to Ms. Kruse via fax, e-mail and certified mail.

*January 10, 2007 – Internal Discussion/Telephone Conversation with Fran Long*

Mr. Munster, Mr. Gardner and Ms. Cegielski discussed the timing of traveling to Montrose to gather the necessary information in order to conduct an investigation of the election procedures. A determination was made that Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop would travel to Montrose on January 11 and 12, 2007 and return with all requisite information. Mr. Munster, Mr. Gardner and Ms. Cegielski spoke via telephone with Fran Long, the new County Clerk & Recorder, and Robert Hill, the County Attorney for Montrose, and advised the two of the visit.

The Secretary of State staff also asked Ms. Long if she had knowledge as to whether or not the Security Plan had been submitted for review. Ms. Long informed the staff that she had seen a certified mail receipt copy in the office and assumed that the document had been sent. As of this date, January 10, 2007, this Office had not received the Security Plan.

**Legal Authority**

The right to vote is fundamental to our democracy. The Colorado Constitution requires the general assembly to "pass laws to secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise. The general assembly has delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of State.

Section 1-1-107, C.R.S., authorizes the Secretary of State:

(2)(b) To inspect, with or without the filing of a complaint by any person, and review the practices and procedures of county clerk and recorders, elections commissions, their employees, and other election officials in the conduct of primary, general, and congressional vacancy elections and the registration of electors in this state.

Section 1-1.5-104, C.R.S., gives the Secretary of State investigatory authority:

(2)(a) Acting either upon his or her own initiative or upon a complaint submitted to him or her giving the secretary reasonable grounds to believe that an election in



this state is not being conducted in accordance with the requirements of HAVA or of this code, the secretary may investigate the allegation of noncompliance.

## **Colorado Secretary of State Investigation of the Montrose County 2006 General Election**

### ***Investigation Procedure – Data Gathering***

#### ***January 11, 2007 – Day 1 of Data Gathering***

Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop arrived at the Clerk's office at approximately 11:00 a.m. They met with Ms. Long and Ms. Rudy and outlined the list of items to be gathered, with Mr. Gardner focusing on the paper items and Mr. Bishop focusing on the electronic items. At this time Ms. Long informed the Secretary of State representatives ("Representatives") that the signature cards and the information contained within the pollbooks did not appear to balance. Ms. Rudy informed the representatives that the judges at the polling locations had a difficult time reporting consistently. Problems included voters signing the wrong line in the pollbook; judges recording information on the wrong line in the pollbook; no notes written in the pollbook to tie it back to the signature card; a pollbook entry exists but there is no coordinating signature card.

Mr. Gardner then requested all Mobile Ballot Box cards ("MBB"), at which time Ms. Rudy entered a locked room and returned with ten (10) MBBs. Ms. Rudy presented the MBBs to Mr. Gardner unsealed and not stored in a security canister as required in the Security Plan pursuant to Secretary of State Rule 43. The Representatives utilized a copy of the Elections databases provided by the Clerk's office on November 20, 2006, to ensure that all MBBs had been provided. Upon comparing the databases to the number of MBBs provided by Ms. Rudy, Mr. Gardner determined that five (5) MBBs were unaccounted for. Ms. Rudy once again proceeded to the locked room and returned with four (4) additional MBBs, two of which were not for the 2006 General Election. At this time, the Representatives labeled all MBBs provided to them and recorded the information on a Chain of Custody Log ("Log"), in order to establish a chain of custody and to ensure that all materials were accounted for and returned to the Clerk. Mr. Gardner notified Ms. Cegielski of the unsecured MBBs and asked whether or not to proceed; Ms. Cegielski and Mr. Munster advised Representatives to continue collecting information and document all security breeches.

Ms. Rudy continued to look for the three (3) missing MBBs but only as she "remembered" the request from Representatives. It appeared to Mr. Gardner that due to Ms. Rudy's disorganization she often forgot what items Representatives had requested from her, even though she had been provided both a handwritten and a typed checklist of requested items upon the arrival of Representatives.

Mr. Gardner noted that the MBBs did not have the required permanent seal and that there was no documentation associated with their transfer or with the number of cards used so as to confirm that all were provided, as required by the Security Plan. Additionally, the manner in which the MBBs were labeled was inconsistent with the data on the MBB. Some of the MBBs were labeled as test cards, but Ms. Rudy informed Representatives that the cards were used on



Election Day. Other labeling issues included MBBs labeled as audio only cards, but they contained votes; cards labeled as Early Voting or Election Day, but when inspected it was determined that the cards applied to neither. Ms. Rudy told representatives that she would know what was represented on each MBB based upon the number of votes on the MBB, however when presented with the information she could not recall how or where the MBB was used.

Ms. Rudy continually produced MBBs throughout the day for the Representatives to copy. The Representatives indicated that it appeared that Ms. Rudy was increasingly confused as she tried to recollect which cards performed which function. Representatives discovered some MBBs in test mode, one with 99 votes cast on it; MBBs with election IDs that did not match the databases provided; and no consistency in the labeling on the MBBs.

While Mr. Bishop made copies of the MBBs, Mr. Gardner spoke with Ms. Rudy and requested a hard copy of the Security Plan. Ms. Rudy indicated that she had mailed the plan to the Office in early January and that someone in the Office had signed for it, but produced no evidence in support of such. Mr. Gardner stated that the document had not been given to him and requested that Ms. Rudy provide him a hard copy while he was in the Clerk's office. Ms. Rudy did not immediately provide a copy of the Security Plan, in fact Mr. Gardner witnessed the Security Plan on Ms. Rudy's computer screen and hard copy on her desk while she was at her desk working. Additionally, as Mr. Gardner noticed that Ms. Rudy appeared to still be attempting to complete the Security Plan, she commented that she was in the process of finishing it so as to provide him a copy before his departure. Once again, Mr. Gardner contacted Ms. Cegielski, this time notifying her of the issue of the incomplete Security Plan.

Mr. Gardner requested voter count reports for Absentee, Early Voting and Election Day from the Integrity system while Mr. Bishop collected screen shots from the System for Election Verification of Operations<sup>4</sup> ("SERVO") application in order to identify the content of each MBB.

At approximately 1:00 p.m. Mr. Bishop requested information from the Clerk's staff related to the Tally software. The Tally software counts all votes recorded on an MBB and provides a total of all votes cast. Lura Kuchyt, Clerk's office election staff member, informed the Representatives that the system was password protected and only Ms. Rudy possessed the password. Representatives decided to attempt to access the system by using a blank password, and were successful. Representatives then created a valid password, locked the computer and went to lunch. Mr. Gardner, again, contacted Ms. Cegielski to notify her of the discovery of the blank password. Prior to leaving for lunch, Representatives sealed all materials collected to that point, signed the seals and recorded the information on Logs.

At approximately 2:00 p.m., Representatives spoke with Ms. Long about the missing MBBs but were unable to proceed because Ms. Rudy needed to be included in the conversation and to locate the missing MBBs. Representatives then requested the Judge's Booth Controller<sup>5</sup> ("JBC") tapes from Ms. Kuchyt; which once again required the involvement of Ms. Rudy. It took Ms. Rudy and Ms. Kuchyt approximately one (1) hour to gather the information. When the tapes were presented to Mr. Gardner they were in zip lock bags placed in a cardboard box with no

---

<sup>4</sup> SERVO is used to back-up, reset, and maintain inventory of the Hart election equipment.

<sup>5</sup> The JBC houses the MBB which records the votes cast on the DRE.



seals or Logs. Ms. Rudy provided eighteen (18) zip lock bags (two (2) bags each for seven (7) polling locations and two (2) Early Voting sites) and informed Representatives that the tapes were separated by polling location and the label on the zip lock bag indicated the polling location. Mr. Bishop began reviewing the tapes and discovered that the tapes did not match the labeled bag that they were packaged in. Mr. Bishop also noted that the zero tapes run for each location (for each JBC) were not signed by the Election Judges for several locations, and four (4) of the seven (7) tapes showed either a gap in data or no data at all. Additionally, no results tapes were provided for two (2) of the locations; no reconciliation form was provided for four (4) of the locations; and absolutely no tapes were provided for Early Voting locations.

While Mr. Bishop continued making electronic copies of the electronic data provided, Mr. Gardner photocopied the pollbooks, which were organized by polling location, and then continued on by photocopying all signature cards. Mr. Gardner noted that the signature cards were stacked in piles on at least four (4) desks and no tracking or storage information existed. The piles were not labeled with polling location, were in no logical order, and the staff was unaware of whether or not the card had been checked against the pollbook. Ms. Rudy explained that the signature cards were stored by polling location, however the combination of numbers recorded on each card did not support her claim. Mr. Gardner noted, while photocopying the pollbooks, that at least 100 names had flags next to them with no written documentation as to why. Mr. Gardner discovered that the flags represented one of a number of possible reasons: no ID; wrong ID; non-matching ID number; voter voted a provisional ballot; or voter filled out a sample ballot. Mr. Gardner notified Ms. Cegielski that there were a number of instances where ID was missing or incorrect as listed in the pollbook.

At approximately 4:10 p.m., Mr. Gardner notified Ms. Cegielski that he was still missing two (2) MBBs, with no explanation from the Clerk's staff, and that Ms. Rudy could not be found.

Copying of the signature cards continued until 9:00 p.m. Ms. Rudy, Ms. Kuchyt and Evelyn Blanchard, another Clerk office elections staff member, left the office at approximately 8:00 p.m., and Representatives and Ms. Long left at approximately 9:00 p.m.

#### *January 12, 2007 – Day 2 of Data Gathering*

Representatives arrived at the Clerk's office at 8:15 a.m. Upon arriving, Representatives spoke with Ms. Long and updated her on what items they still needed to collect, including two (2) MBBs. Representatives then continued copying paper and electronic records while waiting on Ms. Rudy to provide the requested documentation.

While reviewing the MBBs, Ms. Rudy verbally accused Representatives of erasing data from one of the cards. County Attorney Robert Hill was promptly notified; shortly thereafter Mr. Hill arrived at the Clerk's office and questioned Mr. Gardner and Mr. Bishop. Representatives provided Mr. Hill with all documentation collected to that point so as to illustrate that no information had been, or could have been, erased as alleged. Ms. Rudy was asked to ensure that the information was not on another MBB; she expressed her certainty that it was not, then searched for additional MBBs. Upon further investigation, she located the MBB with the votes, and Mr. Hill promptly left the office.



At approximately 9:30 a.m. Mr. Gardner requested access to the DREs so as to photograph their storage and seals; however, Ms. Rudy denied him access to the equipment, without offering a reason. Mr. Gardner then phoned Ms. Cegielski requesting guidance; shortly after making the call, and prior to a response as to how to proceed by Ms. Cegielski, Mr. Gardner was granted access to the electronic voting equipment. No explanation was offered by Ms. Long or Ms. Rudy as to why he had previously been denied access.

While photographing the equipment, Mr. Gardner was informed that the Election Day Verified Ballot Option<sup>6</sup> ("VBO") was sealed inside each DRE case rather than stored and sealed with the other election records as required by law.<sup>7</sup> The Clerk's office informed Mr. Gardner that they routinely leave the VBO in the machine until the next election; this is not in compliance with Secretary of State Rules<sup>8</sup>.

Ms. Rudy provided Representatives with the Cast Vote Record ("CVR") reports. Representatives asked Ms. Rudy if she had provided them all information requested related to the CVR. Ms. Rudy responded in the affirmative, at which time the Representatives asked her to explain how she was certain that all information had been provided. She could not confirm that she had provided all the records. Representatives reviewed the reports from 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. and determined that they did not possess all the records for the CVR. Ms. Rudy stated that she had been unable to create a back-up, previously or at the time of the request, in order to capture all the records. Mr. Bishop asked if he could attempt to make a back-up and was immediately successful at doing so. While the CVR reports were being reviewed, Representatives realized that they were still missing JBC tapes from three (3) machines. Representatives learned that no record existed for Early Voting, leaving only two (2) missing tapes. Once the data was received, the Representatives sealed all boxes containing documents, both paper and electronic, and signed the accompanying Log.

Representatives left the Clerk's office with all photocopied, electronic, and photographic documentation, in sealed boxes, at approximately 3:20 p.m.

#### *Information Obtained by Representatives*

##### Electronic Copies of:

- BOSS Databases - all five (5) databases used in the election (only three (3) had previously been provided to the Secretary of State)
- Ballot Now Databases
- Some of the MBBs used in the election
- Tally Databases

---

<sup>6</sup> The VBO is the voted Verifiable Paper Audit Trail ("VPAT").

<sup>7</sup> 8 CCR 1505-1 Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules, Rule 11. See also § 1-7-802, C.R.S.

<sup>8</sup> 8 CCR 1505-1 Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules, Rule 11.6.3 (Storage).

Paper Copies of:

- Seven (7) pollbooks
- Early Voting and Absentee Vote Credit from Integrity
- Approximately  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the Signature Cards

*January 16, 2007 – Internal Meeting*

Mr. Gardner and Ms. Cegielski met to discuss the Representative's experience in Montrose. The two discussed, in detail, the findings and the information gathered while Representatives were at the Clerk's office.

Ms. Cegielski took possession of the documents collected and began organizing the information to be audited. Ms. Cegielski and Mr. Bishop recorded seal numbers and signed all Logs associated with the collected information prior to the breaking of any sealed documents.

### Conclusion

The Secretary of State's investigation disclosed the following problems:

#### *Security*

Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Secretary of State Rules and §1-5-616(5), C.R.S., all counties are to file, with the Secretary of State, security procedures that meet the minimum standards set forth in the rule. Rule 43.7 sets forth the minimum standard to include: seals; procedures used to maintain physical security; internal controls for the voting system including software and hardware access controls and password management.

While at the Clerk's office collecting documents, Mr. Gardner documented, by photograph and in writing, a number of security violations. The violations were as follow:

- Ballot Storage Room – the room contains voted ballots; Ballot Origination Software (“BOSS”) application; and video equipment and video recording records.
  - The door to the room was locked when Representatives arrived, but after Ms. Rudy unlocked the door to retrieve requested information it remained unlocked for the rest of the day. Representatives and Ms. Long confirmed that the door was not locked prior to leaving at 9:00 p.m.
  - No facility access logs, as required in part 2(b)(6) of the Security Plan, were found or provided by the Clerk's staff to Representatives.
- MBBs
  - The Clerk's office did not comply with any of the requirements relating to MBBs in part (a) of the Security Plan.
  - No permanent label was placed on the MBBs.



- Chain of Custody
  - No Logs for JBCs.
  - Logs that did exist, did not contain signatures and were not updated.
  - No Logs for MBBs.
  - No Logs for DREs.
- DREs
  - Only some of the machines were properly sealed in accordance with Secretary of State Rules.
  - Voted VBOs were still in the DRE in violation of state law.
- JBCs
  - Only two (2) of the four (4) sides were sealed, as required.
  - No seals were placed on the memory card slots.
- Other
  - Blank password on the Tally computer.
  - Tally computer located near a door accessible to the public.
  - Equipment in need of repair is sent off-site unsealed and without chain of custody documentation.
  - No Logs for receipt or return of equipment or other election related materials.
  - No paper ballot backups.
  - Security cameras were in use and operating as prescribed by the Security Plan, however there were no cameras pointed on the Tally equipment.

Additionally, as previously mentioned, as a result of the *Conroy v. Dennis*<sup>9</sup> lawsuit, every county in the State of Colorado was required to submit a new security plan to be approved by the Secretary of State. The plan was to address specific requirements as set forth in Rule 43 as well as agreed upon by plaintiff's counsel. The security plan was to be submitted for approval no later than October 20, 2006.

As previously stated, Montrose County submitted their Security Plan via facsimile on October 26, 2006, however, only a portion of the plan was received. The Clerk's office did not follow the facsimile with a hard copy so this Office cannot make a determination as to whether or not the entire Security Plan was sent. This Office followed up with "Incomplete Notice A1" on October 29; "Incomplete Notice B1" on November 4; "Incomplete Notice C1" on December 16; by phone on January 10, 2007; and in person on January 11 and 12.

The lack of response from the Clerk's office regarding the Security Plan is of concern, especially in light of the flagrant violations of the required security procedures as noted above.

Representatives inspected an Election Day machine on display at the office containing a JBC tape from Election Day, which should have been sealed as part of the election records, and noticed that seals were being used improperly and not as recommended by the Office. The eSlate unit (DRE) was not sealed on all four (4) sides and the JBC unit was only sealed on two (2) sides, once again not in compliance with rules promulgated by the Secretary of State<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>9</sup> Case No. 06 CV 6072 (2006).

<sup>10</sup> 8 CCR 1505-1 Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules, Rule 43



Montrose County keeps most of the BOSS and Ballot Now equipment behind a security door which only Ms. Rudy has access to. Ms. Rudy was out of the office most of the day, leaving the security door unlocked. It remained unlocked, and accessible to everyone in the office, throughout the day. Additionally, the Tally computer sits approximately ten (10) feet from the public entrance into the Elections department. The Tally software counts all votes recorded on an MBB and provides a total of all votes cast. The software also allows for a user to change totals, e.g. adding or subtracting votes associated with a write-in candidate. The Tally computer did not require a password, security cameras were not fixed on the computer, and the CPU was easily accessible to all Clerk's office staff and the public.

Mr. Gardner noted that the DREs were not centrally located in one room but rather in multiple rooms with no supporting documentation. This illustrates the poor manner in which the Clerk's staff manages, tracks, inventories and secures their voting equipment and election records.

### ***Issues Related to Operation of Voting Equipment***

When Montrose County purchased their DREs from Hart, the decision was made to also purchase the programming software rather than have Hart program the equipment prior to an election. This Office does not see an issue with such a decision, however, the programming by the county proved to be more difficult than anticipated and resulted in a number of avoidable errors.

Ms. Rudy had multiple issues with correctly programming the DREs for write-in candidates. When programming the voting machines, she programmed write-in candidates in the same manner as regular candidates instead of selecting 'Write-In' in the software. This error allowed the voter to select 'Write-In' on the ballot but did not allow for the write-in name to be entered using the keyboard function on the DRE, instead it merely filled the oval as though the voter was voting for candidate 'Write-In'.

§ 1-7-509, C.R.S., and Secretary of State Election Rule 11 require each county to conduct LAT and also set forth the manner in which the LAT is to be conducted. In fact, Secretary of State Election Rule 11.5.1 states that a Hardware Diagnostic Test and a LAT are to be conducted prior to each election. Montrose County did not conduct the required LAT and there is question as to whether or not the Hardware Diagnostic Test was conducted.

The error messages which appeared on some of the DRE machines during the first day of Early Voting were a result of the machines not being reset after the Primary Election. The failure to reset the machines is not only irresponsible but also a failure to perform the duties required in preparation for an election.

Due to the number of issues the Clerk's staff experienced in programming the voting machines, additional databases were required to be created so as to ensure accurate tallying of the votes. Secretary of State Election Rule 11.7.1 requires the county to submit all election setup records to the Secretary of State "no later than 5:00 pm on the seventh (7<sup>th</sup>) day prior to any election." Not only were only three of the five databases used provided to this Office, but they were not provided until November 20, 2006, nearly two (2) weeks after the General Election.



### *Signature Card/Pollbook/Election Judges*

Following the return of Representatives with the documentation acquired while at the Clerk's office, Secretary of State personnel attempted to reconcile the photocopied signature cards to the photocopied pollbooks.

In reviewing the information, several discrepancies were identified:

- Approximately 650 discrepancies between the date on the signature card and the date a voter voted in Early Voting were found.
- The pollbook indicates sending of an absentee ballot and the date on which it was mailed, however there is a signature card signed on Election Day. The pollbook does not reflect that the absentee ballot was ever cancelled nor does it note why the voter was allowed to vote at the polling location on Election Day.
- The voters who were sent to the Courthouse to vote due to problems at their voting location are not identified in the pollbook. There is no manner in which to identify these individuals to ensure that they were properly given credit for voting or for ensuring that they did not cast an additional ballot.
- Representatives noted as many as 100, or more, voters with Post-It flags beside their name in the pollbook. Again, there is no documentation as to why these individuals were flagged. As previously stated, Clerk staff indicated that the flag represented a number of possible issues to include: no ID presented; wrong ID presented; non-matching ID number; the voter voted a provisional ballot; or the voter voted a sample ballot. None of these reasons were documented in the pollbook or on the signature card, and the staff was unable to say which issue pertained to which voter and the resolution.
- The total number of signature cards photocopied by Representatives was approximately 800 short of the total votes cast on Election Day in Montrose County for the 2006 General Election. Due to the disorganization of signature cards at the Clerk's office it is impossible to determine if the county is missing the signature cards or if they were simply misplaced and therefore not copied.

### *Other*

The manner in which records related to the 2006 General Election were maintained is not pursuant to Colorado law and was incredibly disorganized at the time Representatives arrived to gather requested documentation. The signature cards were scattered on desks throughout the Clerk's office and were in no logical order; the MBBs were not clearly marked or identifiable and despite several attempts to provide Representatives with all cards used in the election some remain missing; and the JBC tapes were mislabeled and not readily available for review, nor were all the tapes provided. Mr. Gardner asked to inspect the certification documents, at which time Ms. Rudy spent approximately an hour looking for the information so as to provide documentation to the Representatives.

The Clerk's office experienced a number of difficulties prior to Election Day related to incorrect ballots and duplicate ballots being sent to voters. Ms. Rudy requested help from this Office on



several occasions regarding ballots without questions being sent to voters; ballots with extra questions being sent to voters; duplicate ballot packets sent to voters; and incorrect ballot styles being provided to voters during Early Voting. All this despite the fact that the county only used six (6) ballot styles for the 2006 General Election.

The problems experienced by the Montrose County Clerk and Recorder were further amplified by allowing for a Single Point of Knowledge, which ultimately may lead to Single Point Failure, as in this case. Ms. Rudy appears to have sole knowledge and access to records and documentation associated with any and all elections in Montrose County. This makes documentation retrieval near impossible in her absence and allows for potentially fraudulent problems to easily occur. With so many moving parts in an election, it is critical to have more than one person with first-hand experience and knowledge of the procedures and equipment should problems arise. No one person can – or should – be solely responsible for the entire process. While fraud was not found in this case, a Single Point of Knowledge can increase the likelihood that an attempted fraud occur, and is successful.

### *Post-Election Issues*

Since the certification of the election, Ms. Rudy has been experiencing a number of issues with the Sequoia Integrity (“Integrity”) system. Staff from the Secretary of State’s Office, as well as Sequoia, have been assisting Ms. Rudy in trying to rectify these problems. According to Ms. Rudy, voters in Montrose County are being listed as inactive<sup>11</sup> when in fact they voted in the 2006 General Election. The Clerk’s office mailed postcards to voters whose status changed to inform them of such change. Some of the voters notified the Clerk’s office that they had in fact voted in November and were now concerned that their vote did not count.

Ms. Rudy has alleged either a fault in Integrity or with the report run by this Office; however we are unaware of any other county who uses the Integrity system experiencing the same problem, and the report that is generated by this Office is a direct result of the information entered by the county whereby giving the voter credit for voting. Only one other county has notified this Office of notification in error, and that county is not on the Integrity system and admitted that the parameters used in generating the report were incorrect.

During the time Representatives were collecting documentation, the Montrose staff was very protective of information and somewhat secretive regarding the release of requested information. Additionally, the staff failed to produce requested information in a timely fashion. Representatives noticed that both Ms. Rudy and Ms. Kuchyt would disappear for an hour or longer when attempting to locate requested items.

Representatives experienced a number of difficulties in obtaining information from Ms. Rudy. She denied access on a number of occasions and was seen going into rooms and quickly closing the door behind her in an effort to locate information without Representatives witnessing her actions.

---

<sup>11</sup> § 1-2-605, C.R.S.



**IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE SECRETARY DID NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE THAT THESE VIOLATIONS UNDERMINED THE SECURITY OR INTEGRITY OF THE 2006 ELECTION IN MONTROSE. HOWEVER, THE FACT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS WAS NOT JEOPARDIZED DOES NOT DIMINISH THE NEED TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS.**

### **Recommendations**

The County Clerk and Recorder is the Designated Election Official ("DEO"), as prescribed by law, and is to adhere to the state election code as defined in Title 1 of the Colorado Revised Statutes as well as the rules promulgated by the Secretary of State. Since the responsibility falls on the DEO, it is important to have the proper safeguards in place to ensure compliance with the law. The Single Point of Knowledge issue should be dealt with immediately so as to disperse knowledge throughout the office.

The appropriate changes to security, staffing, and responsibilities must be addressed immediately. This Office, having documented the issues arising out of the 2006 General Election, will be monitoring the county in all subsequent elections. Should the same pattern of issues continue or arise again, the Secretary of State may seek judicial authority as provided by Colorado law to take over control of the election.

### ***Security***

The lack of security, as documented by the attached photographs, is not only in violation of state law but also lends itself to questions of integrity and fraud. The Clerk's office has submitted a Security Plan which has been approved by the Secretary of State; the next step is the implementation of said Security Plan. The staff of the Office is available to assist with recommendations and aid in implementation so as to ensure all requirements are met and future elections are not at risk.

### ***Training***

One of the key elements to a successful election is the knowledge possessed by Election Judges. Proper, and thorough, training of these men and women is a critical piece of election preparation. The Clerk's staff admitted that inconsistencies in pollbook recording by the Election Judges, and this Office found discrepancies with the supporting pollbook documentation. The Oath for Judges, Registration Verification and Certifications/Record of Assistance for Disabled Voters was missing, incomplete or partially complete at each of the seven (7) polling locations. This issue can be addressed through better judges training.

The vast number of difficulties, with both the DREs and Integrity, experienced by the Clerk's office is concerning to this Office. As a result, additional training with both Hart and Sequoia is recommended. Training with these vendors should not be limited to one staff member, but rather additional staff since knowledge on each system would better serve the county and the voters.



The Elections Division of the Secretary of State's Office conducts HAVA and election law training sessions for county clerks as well as their elections staff. It is recommended that the Clerk and key staff members participate in the trainings, and ensure the achievement of a diverse coverage of all courses. This Office will be conducting an Elections 101 training on March 21 and 22, 2007 as well as HAVA Certification courses in April and June of this year. Additionally, this office encourages the Clerk to review the election laws prior to any election to ensure compliance.

This Office further recommends that Clerk's staff attend the various clerks' conferences during the year. The meetings will afford the opportunity to meet clerks throughout the state and provide a valuable source of reference as election time approaches.


***Other***

The lack of organization within the office in general, as well as with the election records, should be addressed immediately. Signature cards were scattered throughout the office in stacks that had no meaningful order. Additionally, the presentation of requested documents and storage of voting equipment was substandard. A logical and organized manner of storing election records should also be implemented immediately. Doing this will ensure integrity of the records while being stored for the required 25 months.

This Office further recommends the Clerk consider hiring an outside audit firm to assess the processes and procedures within the Elections Division of the Montrose County Clerk and Recorder's Office.


Implementation of the aforementioned recommendations is the start to ensuring safe and secure elections in Montrose County, as well as the restoration of voter confidence in the process and the Montrose County Clerk and Recorder.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26<sup>th</sup> Day of February, 2007.

  
Stephanie Cegielski  
Legal Specialist  
Office of the Secretary of State

Date: February 26, 2007

APPROVED:

  
Mike Coffman  
Colorado Secretary of State



**MONTROSE COUNTY**  
COLORADO

CLERK AND RECORDER'S OFFICE


RECEIVED

NOV 28 2006


ELECTIONS  
SECRETARY OF STATE

November 27, 2006


We, the undersigned Board of Canvassers, certify that the forgoing results are true and correct to the best of our knowledge.


  
Kathryn Bruce

  
Patricia Johnson

  
Cathy Hermanns

  
Duane Watford

  
Richard Harding

  
Sophia McMillon



Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party Candidate

Representative to the 110th U S Congress-District 3, Vote For 1

REP	Scott Tipton	6117
DEM	John Salazar	5931
LIB	Bert L. Sargent	317
	Unresolved Write-Ins	3
	Rejected Write-Ins	0
	<b>Cast Votes:</b>	<b>12368</b>
	<b>Over Votes:</b>	<b>0</b>
	<b>Under Votes:</b>	<b>199</b>

Governor/Lieutenant Governor, Vote For 1

REP	Bob Beauprez / Janet Rowland	6067
DEM	Bill Ritter Jr. / Barbara O'Brien	5639
AME	Clyde J. Harkins / Tracy Davison	141
LIB	Dawn Winkler-Kinader / Richard Randall	276
UNA	Paul Noel Fiorino / Heather Anne McKibbin	118
	Unresolved Write-Ins	15
	Rejected Write-Ins	7
	<b>Cast Votes:</b>	<b>12263</b>
	<b>Over Votes:</b>	<b>16</b>
	<b>Under Votes:</b>	<b>293</b>

Secretary of State, Vote For 1

DEM	Ken Gordon	4237
REP	Mike Coffman	7809
	<b>Cast Votes:</b>	<b>12046</b>
	<b>Over Votes:</b>	<b>2</b>
	<b>Under Votes:</b>	<b>524</b>

State Treasurer, Vote For 1

REP	Mark Hillman	7648
DEM	Cary Kennedy	4259
	<b>Cast Votes:</b>	<b>11907</b>
	<b>Over Votes:</b>	<b>0</b>
	<b>Under Votes:</b>	<b>665</b>

most of  
CAST VOTES +  
UNRESOLVED  
UNRECORDED  
= 12572

RECEIVED  
NOV 23 2006  
ELECTIONS  
SECRETARY OF STATE

Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party	Candidate
-------	-----------

Attorney General, Vote For 1

DEM	Fern O'Brien	3865
REP	John Suthers	7436
LIB	Dwight K. Harding	639

Cast Votes: 11940

Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 632

Regent of the University of Colorado-At Large, Vote For 1

DEM	Stephen C. Ludwig	3395
REP	Brian Davidson	6343
LIB	Daniel "Jeffersonian" Ong	482
AME	Douglas "Dayhorse" Campbell	573
UNA	Marcus C. McCarty	464

Cast Votes: 11257

Over Votes: 4  
 Under Votes: 1311

Regent of the University of Colorado Congressional District 3,

DEM	Susan A. Hakanson	3661
REP	Tilman "Tille" Bishop	7840

Cast Votes: 11501

Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 1070

State Senate - District 6, Vote For 1

DEM	James Isgar	5743
REP	Ron Tate	6328

Cast Votes: 12071

Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 501

State Representative - District 68, Vote For 1

REP	Raymond J. Rose	8247
DEM	Brian John Ahern	3755

Cast Votes: 12062

Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 569

RECEIVED  
 NOV 28 2006  
 ELECTIONS  
 SECRETARY OF STATE



Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party	Candidate
-------	-----------

County Commissioner - District 2, Vote For 1		
DEM	Bob Connor	4948
REP	Gary Ellis	7208
Cast Votes: 12156		
Over Votes: 2		
Under Votes: 414		

County Clerk & Recorder, Vote For 1		
DEM	Regina Sowell	4664
REP	Fran Long	7354
Cast Votes: 12018		
Over Votes: 1		
Under Votes: 553		

County Treasurer, Vote For 1		
REP	Rosemary M. Murphy	10132
Cast Votes: 10132		
Over Votes: 0		
Under Votes: 2440		

County Assessor, Vote For 1		
REP	Brad Hughes	9870
Cast Votes: 9870		
Over Votes: 2702		
Under Votes: 12347		

County Sheriff, Vote For 1		
REP	Ricki Dunlap	8135
DEM	Andrew Major	2762
	ROBERT WALRAVEN (W)	1450
	Unresolved Write-ins	
	Rejected Write-ins	
Cast Votes: 12347		
Over Votes: 1		
Under Votes: 284		

County Surveyor, Vote For 1		
No Candidate for Race		0
Cast Votes: 0		

RECEIVED  
 NOV 27 2006  
 ELECTIONS  
 SECRETARY OF STATE

Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party	Candidate
County Coroner, Vote For 1	
REP	Tom Canfield
UNA	Michael "Duke" Richardson

REP	Tom Canfield	8615
UNA	Michael "Duke" Richardson	3223

Cast Votes: 11838  
 Over Votes: 2  
 Under Votes: 732

Shall Judge Russell E. Carparelli of the Colorado Court of

YES 6846  
 NO 3388

Cast Votes: 10234  
 Over Votes: 3  
 Under Votes: 2335

Shall Judge Janice B. Davidson of the Colorado Court of

YES 6792  
 NO 3407

Cast Votes: 10199  
 Over Votes: 2  
 Under Votes: 2371

Shall Judge Alan M. Loeb of the Colorado Court of Appeal

YES 6591  
 NO 3554

Cast Votes: 10145  
 Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 2427

Shall Judge Jose D.L. Marquez of the Colorado Court of Ap

YES 6152  
 NO 4057

Cast Votes: 10209  
 Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 2362

RECEIVED  
 NOV 28 2003  
 ELLIOTT  
 SECRETARY



Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party	Candidate
-------	-----------

Shall Judge Robert M. Russell of the Colorado Court of Appeals

YES 6873  
 NO 3971

Cast Votes: 10144  
 Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 2427

Shall Judge John J. Mitchell of the Montrose County Court be

YES 7407  
 NO 3526

Cast Votes: 10933  
 Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 1638

STATE OF COLORADO, Vote For 0

No Candidate for Race

Cast Votes: 0

Amendment 38, Vote For 1

YES 3538  
 NO 8395

Cast Votes: 11933  
 Over Votes: 4  
 Under Votes: 635

Amendment 39, Vote For 1

YES 4419  
 NO 7644

Cast Votes: 12063  
 Over Votes: 2  
 Under Votes: 507

Amendment 40, Vote For 1

YES 5418  
 NO 6669

Cast Votes: 12087  
 Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 424

RECEIVED  
 NOV 27 2006  
 SECRETARY OF STATE

Total Number of Voters : 7,375 of 0 = 0.00%

Party Candidate

Amendment 41, Vote For 1

YES 7337  
 NO 4706

Cast Votes: 12043

Over Votes: 1

Under Votes: 528

Amendment 42, Vote For 1

YES 6146  
 NO 6151

Cast Votes: 12297

Over Votes: 1

Under Votes: 274

Amendment 43, Vote For 1

YES 8505  
 NO 3864

Cast Votes: 12369

Over Votes: 4

Under Votes: 199

Amendment 44, Vote For 1

YES 3485  
 NO 8844

Cast Votes: 12329

Over Votes: 1

Under Votes: 242

Referendum E, Vote For 1

YES 9248  
 NO 2882

Cast Votes: 12130

Over Votes: 1

Under Votes: 441

RECEIVED  
 NOV 27 2006  
 ELECTIONS  
 SECRETARY OF STATE



Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party	Candidate
-------	-----------

Referendum F, Vote For 1

YES  
NO

Cast Votes: 4375  
 Over Votes: 7100  
 Under Votes: 11475  
 0  
 1097

Referendum G, Vote For 1

YES  
NO

Cast Votes: 7842  
 Over Votes: 2831  
 Under Votes: 11693  
 878

Referendum H, Vote For 1

YES  
NO

Cast Votes: 5125  
 Over Votes: 6141  
 Under Votes: 11866  
 704

Referendum I, Vote For 1

YES  
NO

Cast Votes: 3611  
 Over Votes: 8009  
 Under Votes: 12220  
 3  
 349

Referendum J, Vote For 1

YES  
NO

Cast Votes: 4932  
 Over Votes: 7034  
 Under Votes: 11966  
 3  
 603

RECEIVED  
 NOV 27 2006  
 ELECTIONS  
 SECRETARY OF STATE

Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party	Candidate
-------	-----------

Referendum K, Vote For 1

YES 7362  
 NO 4652

Cast Votes: 12014

Over Votes: 2  
 Under Votes: 556

MONTROSE COUNTY BALLOT ISSUE 1A, Vote For 1

YES 8455  
 NO 3487

Cast Votes: 11942

Over Votes: 1  
 Under Votes: 629

CITY OF MONTROSE REFERENDUM 2A, Vote For 1

FOR THE MEASURE 3490  
 AGAINST THE MEASURE 1674

Cast Votes: 5164

Over Votes: 4  
 Under Votes: 361

TOWN OF OLATHE BALLOT ISSUE 2B, Vote For 1

YES 135  
 NO 130

Cast Votes: 265

Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 16

WEST END SCHOOLS RE-2 BALLOT ISSUE 3 A, Vote For 1

YES 414  
 NO 318

Cast Votes: 732

Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 9

RECEIVED  
 NOV 21 2006  
 ELECTIONS  
 SECRETARY OF STATE



Total Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Party  Candidate

MONTROSE REGIONAL LIBRARY DISTRICT BALLOT

YES  
NO

54


155

39

Cast V 194

Over V 0  
Under V 3

RECEIVED  
NOV 27 2006  
ELECTIONS  
SECRETARY OF STATE



I, Carol S. Thorne, Montrose County Clerk and Recorder do hereby certify that the results of the November 7, 2006 General Election held in Montrose County and all herein noted are the true and correct results to the best of my knowledge.

Carol S. Thorne

**Kathryn Mikeworth**

---

**From:** Carol Kruse [ckruse@co.montrose.co.us]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 29, 2006 4:24 PM  
**To:** Kathryn Mikeworth  
**Subject:** Write-ins

Kathryn,

Montrose County had 15 write-in votes for Sylvester and no other write-in votes except for a local sheriff's race. If you need those counts please let me know.  
Carol Kruse, Montrose County Clerk & Recorder



Sessie,

It was a pleasure talking to you earlier. We are all learning this new system and I believe this is the way it goes:

In the Governor's race there were 22 write - in votes for Sylvester total. 15 of the votes were good and 7 were rejected. To the best of my knowledge the only other write- in votes were in the Montrose County race for Sheriff in which Walraven received 1450 votes. I hope this clears up any concerns!

Lura Kuchyt  
Montrose County  
Elections Dept

**RECEIVED**

NOV 29 2006

L  
K  
ELECTIONS DEPT

**Kathryn Mikeworth**

---

**From:** Debbie Rudy [drudy@co.montrose.co.us]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 12, 2006 3:05 PM  
**To:** Kathryn Mikeworth  
**Subject:** amended official results

Kathryn,

First, our active registered voters for this election--19,948.

Second, there were two errors on our official results that were sent to you on the 27th of November. Responses from Lura and Carol notwithstanding, the write-ins for the Rep to the 110th U S Congress--District 3 are incorrect, as are the write-ins for the Governor/Lieutenant Governor race. There are no valid write-ins for either race. The numbers were picked up from the absentee results and should have been shown as rejected, which the amended page that was faxed to Barbara reflects.

If you have any questions, please let me know. I probably shouldn't let a little thing like surgery on my husband keep me away from my duties, but, as I believe I might have told my boss, I do have a life that does not involve this job.

Debbie, Montrose County

**RECEIVED**

**DEC 12 2006**

**ELECTORAL DIVISION  
SECRETARY OF STATE**





Attachment 4  
Amendment to Official Results

**MONTROSE COUNTY**  
COLORADO

CLERK AND RECORDER'S OFFICE

**RECEIVED**

DEC 12 2006

ELECTIONS LICENSING  
SECRETARY OF STATE

fax

to: *BARBARA*

fax #: *303-869-4861*

from: *Debbie, Elections*

date: *12-12-06*

subject: *Amendment to official results*

pages: */plus cover sheet*

NOTES:

**FAXED**

MEMBER TO SURRENDER DISTRICT 3 AND GOVERNOR

Received Dec-12-06 14:15

21 Number of Voters : 4,886 of 0 = 0.00%

Preservative to the 110th U S Congress-District 3, Vote For 1

Party	Candidate	Count
REP	Scott Tipton	6117
JEM	John Salazar	5931
JB	Bert L. Sargent	317
	Unresolved Write-Ins	0
	Rejected Write-Ins	3

Cast Votes: 13562  
 Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 1771

Senator/Lieutenant Governor, Vote For 1

EP	Bob Beauprez / Janet Rowland	6047
EM	Bill Ritter Jr. / Barbara O'Brien	5035
ME	Clyde J. Harkins / Tracy Davison	1411
IB	Dawn Winkler-Kinlander / Richard Randall	276
NA	Paul Noel Florino / Heather Anne McKibbin	118
	Unresolved Write-Ins	150
	Rejected Write-Ins	422

Cast Votes: 12263  
 Over Votes: 16  
 Under Votes: 293

Mayor of State, Vote For 1

EM	Ken Gordon	4237
EP	Mike Coffman	1809

Cast Votes: 12046  
 Over Votes: 2  
 Under Votes: 5204

Treasurer, Vote For 1

EP	Mark Hillman	7648
EM	Cary Kennedy	4259

Cast Votes: 11907  
 Over Votes: 0  
 Under Votes: 665

FAXED

RECEIVED

DEC 12 2006

ELECTION SECRETARY

FOR PHONE CALL TO  
 DEBBIE ON  
 12-12-06  
 NO WRITE INS  
 COUNTERS FOR  
 GENERAL ELECTION

STATE OF COLORADO  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 270  
Denver, CO 80290



Gigi Dennis  
Secretary of State

Holly Z. Lowder  
Director, Elections Division

October 4, 2006

Attachment 5  
Request for Security Plan  
October 4, 2006

HON CAROL L. KRUSE  
MONTROSE COUNTY CLERK  
320 SOUTH 1<sup>ST</sup> STREET  
MONTROSE CO 81402-1289

RE: Colorado County Security Procedures

Pursuant to the Denver District Court order, all county clerk and recorders will be required to file updated security and contingency requirements with the Secretary of State's office by October 20, 2006.

Attached are the requirements defined and approved by the plaintiff and the Judge that shall be implemented for the November 2006 General Election.

There are several important changes to be aware of with the new standards:

- All items in the security plan must be addressed on a point by point basis. Please be sure to be very detailed in your explanation of each point.
- We have created a template (<http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=837>) for updating your security plan for submission. Please feel free to use this template to assist you in reporting your security plans in a detailed manner.
- The new standards require several types of logs to be used for tracking purposes. We have created sample templates (<http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=837>) that you may use to meet these requirements and have posted them on the clerk's corner. If you should choose to create your own template, please make sure it includes all the information listed, and include a sample of your template with your updated security plan.
- All security plans must be submitted to John Gardner ([john.gardner@sos.state.co.us](mailto:john.gardner@sos.state.co.us)).

In an effort to assist you with implementing these new requirements, we have reviewed your current security plan to determine the specific changes necessary. Please address the items listed in the attached document and resubmit your updated security plan for approval no later than October 20, 2006.

We are available to assist you with any questions or concerns you may have regarding this process. Please contact John Gardner (303) 894 - 2200 x6318 or Tim Bishop (303) 894 - 2200 x6324, with any questions you have regarding your security plan.

Thank you for addressing this,

John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 370  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861



# State of Colorado Security Procedures For Electronic Voting Systems

## Security plan status for Montrose County

Section: General Requirements, Clarifications on Statements, and Definitions

Item a: Need to provide further detail

Item b: Need to provide further detail

Item c: Need to provide further detail

Item d: Need to provide further detail

Item e: Need to provide further detail

Item f: Need to provide further detail

Section: 1. Physical Locking Mechanisms and Seals

Item 1.a.i: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.a.ii: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.a.iii: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.a.iv: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.a.v: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.a.vi: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.b: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.c.i: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.c.ii: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.c.iii: Need to provide further detail

Item 1.d: Need to provide further detail

Section: 2. Individuals with Access to Keys, Door Codes, and Vault Combinations

Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail

Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail

Item 2.a.i: **Not Applicable**

Item 2.a.ii: **Not Applicable**

Item 2.a.iii: **Not Applicable**

Item 2.a.iv: **Not Applicable**

Item 2.a.v: **Not Applicable**

Item 2.a.vi: **Not Applicable**

Item 2.b.i: Need to provide further detail

Item 2.b.ii: Need to provide further detail

Item 2.b.iii: Need to provide further detail

Item 2.b.iv: Need to provide further detail

Item 2.b.v: Need to provide further detail

Item 2.b.vi: Need to provide further detail

Section: 3. Temperature-controlled Storage

Item 3.a: Need to provide further detail

Item 3.b: Need to provide further detail

Item 3.c: Need to provide further detail

Item 3.d: Need to provide further detail

Item 3.e: Need to provide further detail

Item 3.f: Need to provide further detail

Section: 4. Security Cameras or Other Surveillance

Item 4.a.i: **Not Applicable**

Item 4.a.ii: **Not Applicable**

Item 4.a.iii: **Not Applicable**

Item 4.b.i: Need to provide further detail

Section: 5. Equipment Maintenance Procedures

Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail

Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail

Paragraph 3: Need to provide further detail

Paragraph 4: Need to provide further detail

- Paragraph 5: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 6: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 7: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 8: Need to provide further detail

**Section: 6. Transportation of Equipment, Ballot Boxes, and Ballots**  
**Delivery TO**

- Item 6.a: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.b: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.c: Need to provide further detail

**Delivery FROM**

- Item 6.a.i: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.a.ii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.a.iii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.a.iv: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.a.v: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.b.i: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.b.ii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.b.iii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 6.b.iv: Need to provide further detail

**Section: 7. Emergency Contingency Plans for Voting Equipment and Voting Locations**  
Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail  
Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail

**Section: 8. Internal Controls for the Voting System**

- Item 8.a: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.b: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.c: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.d: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.e.i: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.e.ii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.e.iii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.e.iv: Need to provide further detail
- Item 8.f: Need to provide further detail

**Section: 9. Security Training for Election Judges**

- Item 9.a: **Not Applicable**
- Item 9.b: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.b: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.i: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.ii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.iii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.iv: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.v: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.vi: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.vii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.viii: Need to provide further detail
- Item 9.c.ix: Need to provide further detail

**Section: 10. Remedies**

- Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 3: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 4: Need to provide further detail
- Paragraph 5: Need to provide further detail

**Section: 11. Optional Physical Security Procedures**  
Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail

**Theresa Holst**

---

**From:** Theresa Holst  
**Sent:** Monday, October 23, 2006 2:52 PM  
**To:** John Gardner  
**Cc:** Tim Bishop  
**Subject:** Delinquent Security Plan Follow Up

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Montrose County: 10-23-06**  
**Left Voice mail for Carol Kruse 2:36 P.M.**  
**Left message with Kathryn 10-23-06 2:51 P.M.**



**Theresa Holst**

---

**From:** John Gardner  
**Sent:** Monday, October 23, 2006 8:28 AM  
**To:** Montrose County  
**Cc:** Theresa Holst  
**Subject:** Security Plan for 2006 General Election

Our office has not received a submission from Montrose County for a security plan for the 2006 General Election. The security plans were due to our office on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006. Montrose County is currently not compliant with the requirements for security plans as identified in C.R.S. 1-5-616(5)(a), SOS Rule 43, and the Order by our office on September 27, 2006 to adhere to additional uniform standards for your voting system security plan.

Please send a copy of the required security plan to John Gardner ([john.gardner@sos.state.co.us](mailto:john.gardner@sos.state.co.us)) as soon as possible.

Additional information can be located on the Clerk's Corner of our website. Details such as sample logs, frequently asked questions, and fill-able forms to respond to the security plan are available to help assist you in meeting this requirement.

If you have any questions regarding the requirements for security plans, or you believe you have already submitted your security plan, please contact me directly.

Thank you for addressing this.

John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 270  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

*Kathryn*  
*2:36 p.m 10/23/06*  
*left V.M.*  
*left message w/ Kathryn*  
*2:51 p.m*



**MONTROSE COUNTY**  
COLORADO

Attachment 7  
Security Plan Submission - Partial  
October 26, 2006

CLERK AND RECORDER'S OFFICE

RECEIVED

FAXED  
FAXED

OCT 26 2006

ELECTIONS / LICENSING  
SECRETARY OF STATE

fax

to: 505 John GARDNER

fax #: 303-869-4861

from: Debbie, Elections

date: 10-26-06

subject: Security Plan

pages: 2 plus cover sheet /

NOTES:

*John - The logs that are with you are attached. I have not identified each, just the text references the type of log that will be used in each situation.  
Also, Evelyn Blanchard  
Lara Kuchyt.*

*and Debbie Judy had over 100 checks done for this year on 10-19-06. Good News/Bad News - we passed, we still have to work.*

*The seals we are using are:  
Healthmark Cynch-Lok Numbered Cert # 6323 599310-08  
and Riffin Arco 3D Tamper Evident Seals  
and Riffin Keyloc Security Seals for  
provisional Bags - Numbered  
592120-07*

P.O. Box 1289 - Montrose, CO 81402 - Phone 970.249.3362 - FAX 970.249.0757

Print Form

Submit by Email

# STATE OF COLORADO SECURITY PROCEDURES For Electronic Voting Systems

## MINIMUM PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The following items represent the minimum security requirements for counties using electronic voting systems, which include the hardware, software, DRE components, optical scan units, and any accessory items used in the operation of the voting system.

### General Requirements, Clarifications on Statements, and Definitions

- a. At all times, removable cards and cartridges that store firmware, software or data are to be handled in a secure manner similar to the handling of paper ballots. This same basic principle shall apply to all V-VPAT records. When not sealed in voting machines, such cards and cartridges shall be transferred in secure containers with at least two tamper-evident seals with printed serial numbers, and the integrity and serial number of each seal shall be verified by election officials at shipping and receiving locations.

Montrose County will follow the procedures outlined in Title 1 for the handling of paper ballots and will use the same methods for handling all vote V-VPAT records. Judges at all remote voting locations will be trained for properly handling and changing the V-VPAT containers on our Hart E-Slates. All seals, both internal and external will be tracked relative to each E-Slate. The judges will have an extra container loaded with a paper roll that will be sealed into its own transfer case. As needed the seal will be broken and tracked to the particular E-Slate that is having paper replaced at that time, as well as a seal log for the transfer case. The judges will take the removed container to a secure location away from the voting machines and remove the used roll, using plain scotch tape to secure the roll (because of the fragility of the thermal paper, any tampering should be very evident). The roll will be replaced from a transfer case containing extra rolls (it also will be sealed, and those seals tracked on a seal log), with the used roll taking the place of the new roll in the transfer case. Each time either transfer case is opened, the breakaway seal will be tracked on the seal log and will be replaced with a new seal. The integrity and serial number of each seal on the transfer cases will be verified by 2 judges and at least 1 election staff at the time of transfer to the election judges. Since the transfer cases are metal with a lock hasp, one plastic numbered breakaway seal will be used, with a tamper evident tape seal over each side of the transfer cases, for the initial transfer. The judges will be provided with an additional pair of tamper-evident tape seals for each transfer case to be used at the end of the day for transferring those supplies and returning them to the Clerk's office.

- b. All documentation of seals, chain of custody, and other documents related to the transfer of equipment between parties shall be maintained on file by the Clerk and Recorder and is subject to inspection by the Secretary of State.

Montrose County will maintain all documentation of seals, chain of custody, and other documents related to transfer of equipment, using the sample logs provided on the SOS website. Since we have made a few adjustments for some logs, copies will be sent under cover of another email. The originals of these logs will be stored in a secure locking cabinet, and will be available for inspection by the Secretary of State's office. Copies of pertinent logs will be supplied to the judges for additional tracking in the polling place, and judges and staff will be signing off on both the original and the copy at the time of transfer. These copies will be made part of the permanent record when they are returned to the election office with the equipment, and will be referenced on the original as an appendix that will be numbered. Our reason for this to ensure the integrity of the security of the various components that must be tracked, since we will retain the original and can verify when logs are returned that nothing was tampered with between times.

*Use notes on cover page.*

The chain of custody for each voting device must be maintained and documented throughout ownership or leasing of the device by the Clerk and Recorder.

*For transferring supplies and returning them to the Clerk's office.*

All of the voting devices and other equipment to be used in the November 2006 General Election are owned by Montrose County. Each device and component of the device will have the chain of custody seal log maintained and updated throughout all events taking place starting 10/15/2006 through the life of the device and our ownership of it.

RECEIVED

FAKED

OCT 26 2006

ELECTIONS / LICENSING  
SECRETARY OF STATE



2-26

d. Only deputized clerks of judges sworn under oath are allowed to handle ballots, which include V-VPAT records.

All of the employees in the Montrose County Clerk & Recorder's elections office are deputized to perform the function of handling ballots and V-VPAT records. All of the elections Judges are sworn under oath to accomplish their duties as well. A list of specific individuals with access of ballots is included in Section 2 of this document.

*deba*

*deba*

e. No additional or modified software developed by the Vendor that is not specifically listed on the Secretary of State's certificate or software developed by a 3rd party that is not off the shelf software (COTS) shall be installed on any component of the voting system.

The Servers and workstations containing the Hart Voting System (HVS) are under the direct control of the Montrose County Clerk & Recorder at all times. Software can only be installed with the witness and approval of our Elections Supervisor - Debbie Rudy. Additionally we will maintain logs of all the software that is installed, including the date/time and user conducting the installation. We have verified that only the certified software, Microsoft Office/Windows products, and Sonic data storage system (for CD back up) are the only software that is installed on the system.

*deba*

*deba*

f. As used in this document, to "date" means to note the month, calendar day, year, hour, minute, and whether the time is a.m. or p.m.

Montrose County will document all date and time annotations with MM/DD/YY, hh/mm format, respectively.

*deba*

*deba*

1. Physical Locking Mechanisms and Seals

a. DREs - all Direct Record Electronic Voting devices shall have tamper-evident seals with printed, unique serial numbers affixed as follows:

i. A seal is to be placed over any removable card or cartridge that is inserted into the unit, or over the door covering the card.

n/a

4 SIDES OF DRE  
STATEMENT ON JBC SECURITY?  
TWO ELECTIONS OFFICIALS?  
AUDIO  
USED  
NOT USED.

AUDIO?

4-26

- b. V-VPATs - all V-VPAT units shall be sealed upon verification of no votes being cast on the paper record prior to being attached to a specific voting device. Seals must be verified by at least two election officials prior to the start of voting, and at the close of voting. V-VPAT records shall either remain in the V-VPAT canister, or be sealed and secured in a suitable device for protecting privacy or as described in Election Rule 11.

All V-VPAT units will have the two halves of the unit sealed upon verification of the no votes being cast on the paper record, by loading a new roll of paper into the unit. This seal will be recorded and verified by two election officials on the chain of custody log for the dre it is being installed with. The V-VPAT will then be sealed into the booth, with that seal also being recorded and verified.

*dfj*

*dfj*

- c. Remote or Central-count Optical Scanners - Optical scanners used in a remote or central tabulating location shall have tamper-evident seals as follows:

- i. A seal is to be placed over each card or cartridge inserted into the unit, or over any door containing the card or cartridge.

At such time that our E-Scan might be used, a breakaway seal will be used to seal the door over the memory card, with the seal # being recorded and verified by 2 signatures on the chain of custody log.

*dfj*

*dfj*

- ii. A seal is to be placed over each empty card or cartridge slot.

A breakaway seal will be used to seal the door on the empty memory card slot until such time as it is used. This seal will be recorded and verified by 2 signatures on the chain of custody log.

*dfj*

*dfj*

- iii. All seals are to be verified by two elections officials.

All seals will be verified by two election officials, notation made by signature on the chain of custody forms.

*dfj*

*dfj*

- d. Memory Cards/Cartridges - Each removable card or cartridge shall have a permanent serial number assigned and securely affixed to it.

All memory cards will be assigned a permanent serial number. The numbers are currently noted on the memory cards, but will be more permanently affixed at a later time. The audio cards have also been assigned serial numbers.

*WHAT? DO - MUST HAPPEN NOW!  
WHY NOT?*

*LOG WHEN*

The Clerk and recorder shall maintain a written log that records which card or cartridge and which seal number is assigned to each voting unit. Any breach of control over a card/cartridge or door or slot for a card/cartridge before an election shall require that the County Clerk be notified and follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Section 10 of these security requirements.

The serial numbers of the memory card assigned to each JBC, and the serial number of the audio card assigned to each Disabled access unit will be kept on the memory card assignment log along with the serial number of the JBC and the serial number of the DRE that the respective cards are assigned to. The log will be maintained in the proper manner along with signatures and date as required. Even though the audio cards are only for facilitating an audio ballot on the disabled access DRE, for uniformity sake it seems prudent to also keep those records.

*dfj*

*dfj*

## 2. Individuals With Access to Keys, Codes, and Vault Combinations

Counties are required to state the names and dates of CBI background check for employees with access to the following areas. Counties may request from the Secretary of State variance with the following requirements only in extreme circumstances.

Employees who have received CBI checks are as follows:

*see cover page defn.*

*DATES?*

The dates of the most recent CBI check will be forthcoming along with the copies of the logs in the email that is to follow.

For all counties, use of door codes, vault combinations, computer and server passwords, encryption key codes, and administrator passwords on voting devices shall be changed at least once per calendar year prior to the first election of the year. Only county employees may be given access to such codes, combinations, passwords, and encryption keys, pursuant to the following limitations.

All computer passwords, and administrator passwords will be changed immediately, to comply with the requirements for this year. In succeeding years, the passwords will be changed once a year as necessary before the first election of the year. The vault where voted ballots and other election records are stored is not accessible to anyone but election employees and the combination will not be changed. If it becomes necessary to change the combination, a hasp and padlock will be installed with key control.

*It is necessary to change vault combos.*

The requirements for a county employee to be given access to a code, combination, password, or encryption key are as follows:

a. Counties over 50,000 registered voters:

i. A maximum of 6 employees shall have access to all areas of election-related work and storage.

*defn*

ii. A maximum of 4 employees shall have access to the storage area for voting equipment.

iii. A maximum of 4 employees shall have access to the counting room or tabulation workstations.

iv. Each individual who has access to the central election management system or central tabulator shall have their own unique username and password. No individual shall use any other individual's username or password. Shared accounts shall be prohibited.

*26?*  
*page 6 of document is missing.*



3. Temperature-controlled Storage

Counties are required to verify the temperature-control settings used with the following components of a voting system. Information submitted to the Secretary of State shall indicate the specifics for each type of component, as well as the specific environment used, which may include, but is not limited to controlled offices, controlled vaults, and controlled warehouses. The settings for temperature control must be at least the following:

- a. Servers and Workstations - Servers and workstations shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. Maximum temperature shall at no time exceed 90 degrees.

All servers and workstations for our Hart system are located in or adjacent to our main office. This floor of our building is on a central air/central heat system, and does not exceed 90 degrees.

*def*

*def*

- b. DREs - DREs shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. The temperature settings shall be maintained at a minimum of 60 degrees and a maximum of 90 degrees.

The DRE's are maintained in a temperature controlled environment that we have available. The storage area is located in another part of our building that does not contain the central air/central heat system. However, because it is on the 2nd floor, it does receive some residual heat from the system, and during frequent checks in the coldest months has never dropped below 60 degrees. In the summer months strategic windows are opened slightly and blocked in that position to protect against egress. With the cross draft created, the temperature never goes over 90 and rarely over 80.

*def*

*def*

- c. Optical Scanners - Scanners shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. The temperature settings shall be maintained at a minimum of 50 degrees and a maximum of 90 degrees.

The Ballot Now Scanner is located in our ballot security room, which has central air/heat as described in a. The heat is no longer turned off at night, so the temperature will never fall below 50 degrees, even during a power outage type of event.

The E-Scan is located in the same storage area as the DRE's and will maintain temperatures between the minimum and maximum as described in b.

*def*

*def*

- d. V-VPAT Records - In addition to the requirements set forth in SOS Rule 11, V-VPAT records shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. The temperature settings shall be maintained at a minimum of 50 degrees and a maximum of 80 degrees. V-VPAT records shall also be maintained in a dry environment, with storage at least 4 inches above the finished floor, for a period of 25 months following the election. The humidity of the environment shall not exceed 80% humidity for a period of more than 24 hours. V-VPAT records shall be stored in a manner that prevents exposure to light, except as necessary during recounts and audits.

Because of the dry climate in Montrose, the humidity in our building is very low, but should humidity become an issue for whatever reason, mitigation efforts would be made by using a dehumidifier to remove the humidity in those areas. The temperature in storage vault where the election records are kept is cooler in summer than the adjacent areas where the DRE's and E-Scan are stored, and stays relatively warmer than those areas. As with all the non central air/heat areas, due diligence will be maintained to ensure that the temperatures remain within the minimum and maximum temperatures required. All V-VPAT records will be stored in sealed metal transfer cases or ballot boxes until the time of protest or recount has passed, and then transferred to closed cardboard boxes at such time that those cases and boxes would be required for use in another election. To meet the requirements of having the records at least 4 inches above the floor, the records will be placed on the high shelves in the storage vault. We will also be having some lower shelves built, with the lowest being no less than 4" from the floor.

25 months?

*def*

E. F. MISSING  
t-GA.

MISSING RECS 8-12 MISSING RECS

13-26

v. County personnel election judges transporting secured voting equipment must maintain chain of custody logs and seal-tracking logs. If there is any evidence of possible tampering with a seal, or if the serial numbers do not agree, they shall immediately notify the County Clerk who shall follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Section 10 of these security requirements.

6  
12/19/08

b. If devices are to be delivered with memory cards/cartridges intact, the following procedures shall be followed:

i. Two election judges shall verify that all seals are intact at the close of polls. Judges will sign the seal-tracking log with such indication. If there is any evidence of possible tampering with a seal, or if the serial numbers do not agree, they shall immediately notify the County Clerk who shall follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Section 10 of these security requirements.

Before returning the equipment to the Clerk's office, two election judges will verify that the seal on the memory card door is intact, and sign the seal tracking log accordingly. If there is any evidence of tampering, or the seal numbers do not agree, the judges shall immediately notify the County Clerk, who will follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Section 10 of these security requirements. In addition, the judges will seal all DRE's and record the seal numbers on the appropriate log.

OK

ii. At least two judges shall accompany the secured equipment to the drop-off location. Seals will be verified, and logs will be signed and dated by the county election official receiving the equipment. If there is any evidence of possible tampering with a seal, or if the serial numbers do not agree, they shall immediately notify the County Clerk who shall follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Section 10 of these security requirements.

At least two judges of different affiliations will accompany the secured equipment to the Clerk's Office. Seals will be verified and logs will be signed and dated by the county election official receiving the equipment. If there is any indication of tampering with a seal or if the serial numbers do not match, the County Clerk will be notified immediately, and will follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Section 10 of these security requirements.

OK

iii. Upon confirmation that the seals are intact and bear the correct numbers, the memory card or cartridge shall be removed and uploaded into the central count system.

Montrose county election officials will confirm that the seals on the JBCs are intact and bear the correct numbers before removing the memory card to be uploaded into the central count system.

OK

iv. Election officials shall secure the equipment by placing a tamper-evident seal over the memory card slot and by updating the documentation to reflect the new seal numbers.

After the memory card is removed, a breakaway seal will be applied to the door covering the empty slot and will be documented on the appropriate logs.

OK

13

missing 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.







**Assignment Log  
Memory Card**

County \_\_\_\_\_

Ref #	Assignment	Start Date	End Date	Time	Officer	Supervisor

**Transfer Case  
Chain of Custody**

County \_\_\_\_\_




### SEAL LOG Chain of Custody

County \_\_\_\_\_

Device SN \_\_\_\_\_  
Device Description \_\_\_\_\_

Device SN	Device Description	Received By	Received Date	Returned By	Returned Date	Comments

If it is detected that the seal has been broken or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number of either a voting device or a memory card or cartridge, CONTACT Clerk & Recorder etc. \_\_\_\_\_



**Theresa Holst**

---

Attachment 8  
E-mail Indicating  
Completion/Submission  
October 26, 2006

**From:** John Gardner  
**Sent:** Friday, October 27, 2006 1:16 PM  
**To:** Theresa Holst  
**Subject:** FW: Montrose County Security Plan

FYI... For Montrose files.

Thanks,  
John G.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** debronrudy@gwe.net [mailto:debronrudy@gwe.net]  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 26, 2006 12:16 AM  
**To:** John Gardner  
**Cc:** Ckruse@co.montrose.co.us  
**Subject:** Montrose County Security Plan

John,

As we discussed on Monday, I have been working on this and it is now finished. I tried to email it but the email button doesn't seem to be working. It may be because I went off line to finish it (too much lightning.) If you did not receive it (or if you receive 3 copies) let me know and I can fax my printed copy to you. You can email me at this email address or at drudy@co.montrose.co.us or call me at 970-252-4580.

In addition, I will also send you an email later today with the logs, referencing when they will be used, dates for when our CBI checks took place and more information about the seals that we are using.

If you have any questions, please let me know. Sorry I couldn't get this to you sooner, but I have talked with you and with Tim on a few occasions about the whole situation.

Debbie  
Montrose County Elections

**Theresa Holst**

---

**From:** John Gardner (away from office) [john.gardner@sos.state.co.us]  
**Sent:** Sunday, October 29, 2006 2:13 PM  
**To:** ckruse@co.montrose.co.us  
**Cc:** Theresa Holst; John Gardner  
**Subject:** Security Plan update Notice A1  
**Attachments:** Security plan update request Montrose- notice a1.pdf

Mildred, please refer to the attached notice regarding your security plan. There are some items that require attention by your office. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to give me a call. It does seem that we were missing several pages from the faxed version of the document that was submitted to our office.

Thank you,  
John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 270  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

STATE OF COLORADO  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 270  
Denver, CO 80290



Gigi Dennis  
Secretary of State

Holly Z. Lowder  
Director, Elections Division

**PLAN ON FILE  
INCOMPLETE NOTICE A1**

October 29, 2006

HON CAROL L. KRUSE  
MONTROSE COUNTY CLERK  
320 SOUTH 1<sup>ST</sup> STREET  
MONTROSE CO 81402-1289

RE: Colorado County Security Procedures – Receipt of Filed Plan

Our office has received your submission of a security plan for the 2006 General Election. We have reviewed your filed plan and found the attached list of items to be incomplete of required data. Please refer to the highlighted areas on the attached sheet and resubmit your updated security plan or file an addendum to your security plan for approval no later than Wednesday, November 1<sup>st</sup>, by end of business.

If you believe any item is impossible to remedy, please notify me within 24 hours for further discussion.

Security plans must be submitted to John Gardner ([john.gardner@sos.state.co.us](mailto:john.gardner@sos.state.co.us)) or to the fax number provided at the bottom of the form.

We are available to assist you with any questions or concerns you may have regarding this process. Please contact John Gardner (303) 894 – 2200 x6318 or Tim Bishop (303) 894 – 2200 x6324, with any questions you have regarding your security plan.

Thank you for addressing these remaining items on your security plan.

Sincerely,

John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 370  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

# State of Colorado Security Procedures For Electronic Voting Systems

## Security plan status for Montrose County

### Section: General Requirements, Clarifications on Statements, and Definitions

Item a. Complete  
Item b. Complete  
Item c. Complete  
Item d. Complete  
Item e. Complete  
Item f. Complete

### Section: 1. Physical Locking Mechanisms and Seals

Item 1.a.i: Need to provide further detail – Please specify the procedures regarding:

- Sample of seal log
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used

Item 1.a.ii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Specify being sealed when the card slot is empty
- Sample of seal log
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used

Item 1.a.iii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Specific statement that seals on the 4 sides will be included
- Sample of seal log
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used

Item 1.a.iv: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Specific location of the seals
- Associated log that will be used for tracking this
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used

Item 1.a.v: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Specific statement addressing the JBC unit – including 4 sides
- Associated log that will be used for tracking this
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used

Item 1.a.vi: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Indication of signatures required

Item 1.b. Complete  
Item 1.c. Complete  
Item 1.d. Complete  
Item 1.e. Complete

Item 1.d: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Please provide details as to how the numbers are affixed currently.
- Method that will be used for assigning serial number
- Sample of log being used
- Please provide details as to why Montrose was unable to achieve this.

Paragraph 1. Complete

### Section: 2. Individuals with Access to Keys, Door Codes, and Vault Combinations

Paragraph 1. Complete

Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- It is required to have all items within compliance for the 2006 General Election.

Item 2.a.1. Not Applicable  
Item 2.a.2. Not Applicable  
Item 2.a.3. Not Applicable



Item 2.a.iv: Not Applicable  
Item 2.a.v: Not Applicable  
Item 2.a.vi: Not Applicable

Item 2.b.i: list names of people with access

Item 2.b.ii: list names of people with access

Item 2.b.iii: list names of people with access

Item 2.b.iv: list names of people with access

- Specific policies and procedures being implemented for compliance

Item 2.b.v: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- How this requirement will be met. Are unique usernames and passwords used?

Item 2.b.vi: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- How this area is secured against unauthorized entrance
- Associated log that will be used for tracking this
- Specific procedures that will be implemented for compliance

### Section: 3. Temperature-controlled Storage

Item 3.a: Complete

Item 3.b: Complete

Item 3.c: Complete

Item 3.d: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Length of time records shall be stored

Item 3.e: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Specific equipment storage location
- Range of temperatures and humidity levels normally reached in this location
- Height of storage units from the floor
- Type of containers used for storage
- Length of time records shall be stored

Item 3.f: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Specific equipment storage location
- Specific method being used to ensure temperature
- Range of temperatures and humidity levels normally reached in this location
- Height of storage units from the floor
- Type of containers used for storage
- Length of time records shall be stored

### Section: 4. Security Cameras or Other Surveillance

Item 4.a: Not Applicable

Item 4.b.i: Not Applicable

Item 4.b.ii: Not Applicable

Item 4.b.i: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Type of security camera equipment
- Procedures for logging and reviewing tape

### Section: 5. Equipment Maintenance Procedures

Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- When the seal will be placed upon the equipment
- Associated log that will be used for tracking this
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used

Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Statement that no maintenance will be required prior to the 2006 General Election
- Seal tracking procedures that will be followed if maintenance is required

Paragraph 3: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Procedure that will be used to remove data
- Format and storage of data that has been removed
- Sample of seal log
- Specific part number of seals being used

Paragraph 4: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Sample of seal log
- Specific part number of seals being used

Paragraph 5: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- When the seal will be placed upon the equipment
- Specific location of the seals
- Seal tracking procedures that will be used
- Sample of seal log
- Signatures that will be required
- Specific part number of seals being used
- Documentation of shipping information

Paragraph 6: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Storage location of associated documentation
- Verification of CBI checks on vendor personnel – dates and names
- Statement of escorting vendor representative

Paragraph 7: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Statement of conducting a mock election
- Storage location of associated documentation

Paragraph 8: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- State specific agreement to SOS inspections

Section: 6. Transportation of Equipment, Ballot Boxes, and Ballots  
Delivery TO

Item 6.a: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- How equipment and supplies will be transported
- Signatures that will be required
- Associated logs that will be used
- Procedures for verification of seals
- Procedures if evidence of tampering is found
- Reference to Section 10

Item 6.b: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- How equipment and supplies will be transported
- Signatures that will be required
- Associated logs that will be used
- Procedures for verification of seals
- Reference to Section 10

Item 6.c: Need to provide further detail or state 'Not Applicable' – Please specify:

- How equipment and supplies will be transported including method chosen (drive with or chase vehicle)
- Signatures that will be required
- Associated logs that will be used
- Procedures for verification of seals
- Reference to Section 10
- Dates and names of CBI checks performed

Delivery FROM

Item 6.a.i: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Is this **Not Applicable (overall for 6a)**, or will the judges be responsible for this at some point?
- Sample of log being used
- Signatures Required
- Reference to Section 10

Item 6.a.ii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Procedures that will be used to achieve this requirement
- Description of transfer case being used
- Sample of log being used
- Part number of seals being used

Item 6.a.iii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Procedures that will be used to achieve this requirement

- Part number of seals being used
- Item 6.a.iv: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Procedures that will be used to achieve this requirement
  - Reference to Section 10
- Item 6.a.v: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Sample of logs being used
  - Reference to Section 10
  - Steps required to re-establish chain of custody and place the unit(s) back in service

Item 6.b.i: Complete  
 Item 6.b.ii: Complete  
 Item 6.b.iii: Complete  
 Item 6.a.iv: Complete

**Section: 7. Emergency Contingency Plans for Voting Equipment and Voting Locations**

- Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific method that will be used to comply with this requirement
- Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Agreement to comply with this requirement

**Section: 8. Internal Controls for the Voting System**

- Item 8.a: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific date changes will occur for 2006
  - Codes, passwords, equipment that will be affected
- Item 8.b: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Date changes will occur for 2006
  - Equipment, devices, and components that will be affected
- Item 8.c: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific people who can provide/change passwords
- Item 8.d: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- If equipment is ever connected to a network or the internet (need statement)
- Item 8.e: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- State whether modems are used for any function and 8.e.i-8.e.v will be Not Applicable
- Item 8.e.i: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific reference to unofficial results
  - Specify if summary tape is printed prior to or after modemming results
- Item 8.e.ii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific reference to if equipment is ever used for programming, setup, or individual ballot casting
- Item 8.e.iii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Date changes will occur for 2006
- Item 8.e.iv: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific people with knowledge of phone number
  - Procedures used to ensure phone number is not visible
- Item 8.f: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- Specific names and dates of CBI checks
  - Sample of storage facility log

**Section: 9. Security Training for Election Judges**

- Item 9.b: provide specific training details
- Item 9.c.i: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.ii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.iii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component

- Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.iv: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.v: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.vi: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.vii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.viii: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail
- Item 9.c.ix: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:
- The method that will be used during training to address this component
  - Provide specific method and/or examples to detail

**Section: 10. Remedies**

Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Logs to be used
- Call list (in order of priority)
- Procedure followed to verify seals

Paragraph 2: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Logs to be used
- Call list (in order of priority)
- Procedure followed to verify seals
- Verify what data is being reconciled (ex: VBO to Servo; VBO to JBC total; V-VPAT to other)

Paragraph 3: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- State specific agreement to this paragraph

Paragraph 4: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- State specific agreement to this paragraph

Paragraph 5: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- State specific agreement to this paragraph

Paragraph 6: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- State specific agreement to this paragraph

**Section: 11. Optional Physical Security Procedures**

Paragraph 1: Need to provide further detail – Please specify:

- Any additional security measured being implemented to ensure security of election equipment



**Theresa Holst**

---

**From:** John Gardner  
**Sent:** Saturday, November 04, 2006 9:48 AM  
**To:** Montrose County  
**Cc:** Theresa Holst  
**Subject:** Security Plan Update Notice B1 - Montrose  
**Attachments:** Security plan update request Montrose -notice b1.pdf

Carol, please see the attached document regarding your security plan. We have not heard back from you since sending you a detailed list of items needing attention in your security plan. We anticipate that you are already working on these items and will be responding prior to election day. If you believe that our records are incorrect in this matter, please contact me as soon as possible and we will research the missing files.

If you are having any problems or issues that cannot be addressed, please give either myself (303)-894-2200 ext. 6318 or Tim Bishop (303)-894-2200 ext. 6324 a call immediately to discuss.

Thank you for addressing these items,

John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 270  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

STATE OF COLORADO  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 270  
Denver, CO 80290



Gigi Dennis  
Secretary of State

Holly Z. Lowder  
Director, Elections Division

November 3, 2006

**PLAN ON FILE  
INCOMPLETE NOTICE B1**

HON CAROL L. KRUSE  
MONTROSE COUNTY CLERK  
320 SOUTH 1<sup>ST</sup> STREET  
MONTROSE CO 81402-1289

RE: Colorado County Security Procedures

Our office has received your submission of a security plan for the 2006 General Election prior to the October 20<sup>th</sup> deadline. Additionally, we have provided you with Notice A1 prior to October 30<sup>th</sup> indicating your plan was incomplete. The instructions you received were to resubmit your updated security plan to our office by November 1<sup>st</sup> or as soon as possible. Our records indicate you have not responded to this request.

It is imperative to the assurance of elections integrity throughout the state that your security plan is updated and complete as soon as possible before the start of voting. In the event of an election challenge or a recount that affects your county or possibly statewide, the examination and evaluation of security measures put in place may be used to determine the integrity of electronic votes.

Security plans must be submitted to John Gardner ([john.gardner@sos.state.co.us](mailto:john.gardner@sos.state.co.us)) or to the fax number provided at the bottom of the form.

As always, we are available to assist you with any questions or concerns you may have regarding this process. Please contact John Gardner (303) 894 - 2200 x6318 or Tim Bishop (303) 894 - 2200 x6324, with any questions you have regarding your security plan.

Thank you for addressing this in preparation for Election Day.

John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 370  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

Holly Lowder

---

**From:** Debbie Rudy [drudy@co.montrose.co.us]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 06, 2006 10:02 AM  
**To:** John Gardner  
**Cc:** Holly Lowder  
**Subject:** inventory

John,

I know you are wanting inventory. I left a message for Tim last week, I don't know which day, indicating that we were going to use the same inventory that we used in the primary, except that I was adding some booths to some of the polling places. Additionally, I have now had to swap out some equipment, and I am sending a fax with the information today.

Debbie, Montrose County

MONTECALMONT  
COLLEGE

CLERK AND RESEARCHER'S OFFICE

URGENT URGENT

fax

TO: JOHN GARDNER

FROM: 303 869 4761

RE: Coobie, Elections

DATE:

SUBJECT: INVENTORY

PAGES: 9 plus cover sheet

NOTES:

ALSO WILL BE WITH  
 Kodak i620 machine  
 serial # 1232161 ✓

HOW MACHINE IS DESIGNATED  
 REMOVED MACHINE ALSO NOTED  
 I WILL ALSO NEED GUIDANCE  
 IF THE MACHINE USED IN EV IS  
 picked - will you designate  
 EV or ED?

P.O. Box 1289 Montpelier, VT 05602 TEL 802.249.3362 FAX 802.249.0757



2  
5  
NO

JBC & eState Serial Numbers Log

ELECTION DAY

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	VALEY BAPTIST CHURCH
Default Time Out:		Date/Time In:	
Sign of Initial:		Sign of Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Seal #	eState Serial #s	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
030874	AF-10	AD8857 ✓		
		AD8854 ✓		
		AD8708 ✓		
		AD8899 ✓		
		AD9241 ✓		
		AD8824 ✓		
		AD8853 ✓		
		AD8852 ✓		
		AD8851 ✓		
		AD8850 ✓		
		AD8849 ✓		
		AD8848 ✓		
		AD8847 ✓		
		AD8846 ✓		
		AD8845 ✓		
		AD8844 ✓		
		AD8843 ✓		
		AD8842 ✓		
		AD8841 ✓		
		AD8840 ✓		
		AD8839 ✓		
		AD8838 ✓		
		AD8837 ✓		
		AD8836 ✓		
		AD8835 ✓		
		AD8834 ✓		
		AD8833 ✓		
		AD8832 ✓		
		AD8831 ✓		
		AD8830 ✓		
		AD8829 ✓		
		AD8828 ✓		
		AD8827 ✓		
		AD8826 ✓		
		AD8825 ✓		
		AD8824 ✓		
		AD8823 ✓		
		AD8822 ✓		
		AD8821 ✓		
		AD8820 ✓		
		AD8819 ✓		
		AD8818 ✓		
		AD8817 ✓		
		AD8816 ✓		
		AD8815 ✓		
		AD8814 ✓		
		AD8813 ✓		
		AD8812 ✓		
		AD8811 ✓		
		AD8810 ✓		
		AD8809 ✓		
		AD8808 ✓		
		AD8807 ✓		
		AD8806 ✓		
		AD8805 ✓		
		AD8804 ✓		
		AD8803 ✓		
		AD8802 ✓		
		AD8801 ✓		
		AD8800 ✓		
		AD8799 ✓		
		AD8798 ✓		
		AD8797 ✓		
		AD8796 ✓		
		AD8795 ✓		
		AD8794 ✓		
		AD8793 ✓		
		AD8792 ✓		
		AD8791 ✓		
		AD8790 ✓		
		AD8789 ✓		
		AD8788 ✓		
		AD8787 ✓		
		AD8786 ✓		
		AD8785 ✓		
		AD8784 ✓		
		AD8783 ✓		
		AD8782 ✓		
		AD8781 ✓		
		AD8780 ✓		
		AD8779 ✓		
		AD8778 ✓		
		AD8777 ✓		
		AD8776 ✓		
		AD8775 ✓		
		AD8774 ✓		
		AD8773 ✓		
		AD8772 ✓		
		AD8771 ✓		
		AD8770 ✓		
		AD8769 ✓		
		AD8768 ✓		
		AD8767 ✓		
		AD8766 ✓		
		AD8765 ✓		
		AD8764 ✓		
		AD8763 ✓		
		AD8762 ✓		
		AD8761 ✓		
		AD8760 ✓		
		AD8759 ✓		
		AD8758 ✓		
		AD8757 ✓		
		AD8756 ✓		
		AD8755 ✓		
		AD8754 ✓		
		AD8753 ✓		
		AD8752 ✓		
		AD8751 ✓		
		AD8750 ✓		
		AD8749 ✓		
		AD8748 ✓		
		AD8747 ✓		
		AD8746 ✓		
		AD8745 ✓		
		AD8744 ✓		
		AD8743 ✓		
		AD8742 ✓		
		AD8741 ✓		
		AD8740 ✓		
		AD8739 ✓		
		AD8738 ✓		
		AD8737 ✓		
		AD8736 ✓		
		AD8735 ✓		
		AD8734 ✓		
		AD8733 ✓		
		AD8732 ✓		
		AD8731 ✓		
		AD8730 ✓		
		AD8729 ✓		
		AD8728 ✓		
		AD8727 ✓		
		AD8726 ✓		
		AD8725 ✓		
		AD8724 ✓		
		AD8723 ✓		
		AD8722 ✓		
		AD8721 ✓		
		AD8720 ✓		
		AD8719 ✓		
		AD8718 ✓		
		AD8717 ✓		
		AD8716 ✓		
		AD8715 ✓		
		AD8714 ✓		
		AD8713 ✓		
		AD8712 ✓		
		AD8711 ✓		
		AD8710 ✓		
		AD8709 ✓		
		AD8708 ✓		
		AD8707 ✓		
		AD8706 ✓		
		AD8705 ✓		
		AD8704 ✓		
		AD8703 ✓		
		AD8702 ✓		
		AD8701 ✓		
		AD8700 ✓		

JBC & Estate Serial Numbers Log

Election:	GENERAL	Poling Place:	EARLY MORNING BEACH DRIVE
Date/Time Out:		Date/Time In:	
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Serial #	Estate Serial #	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
203052		1 007720 ✓		
		2 008522 ✓		
		3 008522 ✓		
		4 009204 ✓		
		5		
		6		
		7		
		8		
		9		
		10		
		11		
		12		
		13		

NEW-BUT NOT USED

01\_JBCeState\_Serial Numbers Log\_rev5.16.031

217

JBC eState Serial Numbers Log

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	EMERY VOTING CENTER OFFICE
Default Time Out:		Default Time In:	
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Seat #	State Serial #	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
09951				
	1	A08906 ✓		
	2	A08399 ✓		
	3	A09328 ✓		
	4	A08453 ✓		
	5	A08646 ✓		
	6	A09120 ✓		
	7	A08997 ✓		
	8	A08208 ✓		
	9	A08399 ✓		
	10	A08000 ✓		
	11			
	12			
	1			
	2			
	3			
	4			
	5			
	6			
	7			
	8			
	9			
	10			
	11			
	12			

O1\_JBCeState\_Serial Numbers Log\_Jen05.18.031

5-12

JBC & aSite Serial Numbers Log

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	MICHAEL E. THORSE
Date/Time Out:		Date/Time In:	ELECTION DAY
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Seat #	aSite Serial #	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
059298E				
	1	A0AE 98 ✓		
	2	R0971 ✓		
	3	A08E0 ✓		
	4	A095E ✓		
	5	A09768 ✓		
	6	A099C9 ✓		
	7	A09248 ✓		
	8	A09067 ✓		
	9			
	10			
	11			
	12			
	1			
	2			
	3			
	4			
	5			
	6			
	7			
	8			
	9			
	10			
	11			
	12			

01\_JBCaSite\_Serial Numbers Log rev6.16.031

6-10

JBC & eState Serial Numbers Log

ELECTION DAY

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	LEGION HALL OLATH
Date/Time Out:		Date/Time In:	
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Serial #	eState Serial #s	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
CO 3489		1. MOAAT ✓		
		2. MO808E ✓		
		3. MO9129 ✓		
		4. MO885CV ✓		
		5. MO824A ✓		
		6. MO9258V ✓		
		7. MO9118A ✓		
		8. MO9205 ✓		
		9. MO9205 ✓		
		10. MO885CV ✓		
		11. MO885CV ✓		
		12. MO885CV ✓		

O:\JBCeState\_Serial Numbers Log\_rev5.16.031



740

JBC & eState Serial Numbers Log

*Electron Day*

<b>Election:</b>		<b>Polling Place:</b>	
<b>Date/Time Out:</b>	<i>GENERAL</i>	<b>Date/Time In:</b>	
<b>Sign or Initial:</b>		<b>Sign or Initial:</b>	<i>Emp Powell</i>

JBC Serial #	JBC Seal #	eState Serial No	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
1		<i>A08253 ✓</i>		
2		<i>A08258 ✓</i>		
3		<i>A09160 ✓</i>		
4		<i>A09080 ✓</i>		
5		<i>A09500 ✓</i>		
6		<i>A08900 ✓</i>		
7		<i>A08215 ✓</i>		
8		<i>A08200 ✓</i>		
9				
10				
11				
12				

01\_JBCeState\_Serial Numbers Log\_rev5.16.031

8-10

JBC & eState Serial Numbers Log

ELECTION DAY

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	MOUNTAIN PASS
Date/Time Out:		Date/Time In:	
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Seal #	aState Serial #s	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
CO 54 D16		1 A091E7 ✓		
		2 A080F0 ✓		
		3 A09264 ✓		
		4 A05209 ✓		
		5 A0915E ✓		
		6 A087E8 ✓		
		7 A0928E ✓		
		8 A094DE ✓		
		9 A0980C (V) ✓		
		10 A08947 (V) ✓		
		11 A08233 (V) ✓		
		12 A091E8 (V) ✓		
		1		
		2		
		3		
		4		
		5		
		6		
		7		
		8		
		9		
		10		
		11		
		12		

9-10

JBC & State Serial Numbers Log

ELECTION DAY

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	FLORISSON HALL PARKLANDS
Date/Time Out:		Date/Time In:	
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Serial #	State Serial No	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
203967		1 A04MCF ✓		
		2 A0225E ✓		
		3 A05769 ✓		
		4 A09162 ✓		
		5 A08202 ✓		
		6 A0834A ✓		
		7 A08728 ✓		
		8 A08775 ✓		
		9 A09209 ✓		
		10 A0930A ✓		
		11		
		12		
		1		
		2		
		3		
		4		
		5		
		6		
		7		
		8		
		9		
		10		
		11		
		12		

O1\_JBCState\_Serial Numbers Log\_JRVS.16.031

10-10

JBC & State Serial Numbers Log

ELECTION DAY

Election:	GENERAL	Polling Place:	DINA
Date/Time Out:		Date/Time In:	
Sign or Initial:		Sign or Initial:	

JBC Serial #	JBC Saw #	State Serial #s	Backup Date & Time	Reset Date & Time
CO 3928				
1		AA 819 A ✓	USED	
2		AA 91870 ✓		
3		AA 9206 ✓		
4		AA 9206 ✓		
5		AA 8266 A ✓		
6		AA 9129 ✓		
7		AA 9168 ✓		
8		AA 8065 ✓		
9		AA 9206 ✓		
10				
11				
12				

Also used during early morning has been returned to main RESET

Attachment 12  
Request for Documentation/Response  
November 16, 2006

County Name: Montrose

Date/Time of Call: 11/16 12<sup>05</sup> p

Person Spoken To: Deb Rudy

1. Can you please send your sample ballot to us? Or at least provide a date as to when the sample ballot will be sent to us? (These are due before early voting starts)

*we have*

2. We haven't received your equipment inventory yet (this is due 10 days prior to the election) - is this something you would be filing on the web with us? If so, provide assistance..... When do you think you would be sending this information to us?

*tomorrow or Weds, adding to old inventory from previous*

3. We haven't received your election setup records yet (this is due 7 days prior to the election) - do you know when we might be receiving this information? (Hart counties, just ask if they can mention this to their account managers)

*working on audio, then send*

4. Finally, we're providing any additional help on the security plans. The deadline for the security plans is THIS FRIDAY (October 20<sup>th</sup>) - do you have any questions (can speak to John or Tim), is there any way that we can help? When do you think you'll be submitting your security plan?

*in process, got new slab, extra locks*



**STATE OF COLORADO**  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 270  
Denver, CO 80290



**Gigi Dennis**  
Secretary of State  
**Holly Z. Lowder**  
Director, Elections Division

**VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY – INCIDENT REPORT**

Pursuant to section 10 of the Security Procedures for Electronic Voting Systems, each county is required to submit a statement to our office addressing the existence or absence of any security issues related to your use of voting equipment. Please use this form to meet this requirement for the 2006 General Election.

Please FAX the SIGNED Form back to John Gardner (303) 869-4861  
prior to 5:00pm on November 24<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

Montrose  
County Name

Please Check the appropriate box:

By checking this box, we are representing that our county **DOES NOT** have any security related incidents to report with the use of our voting equipment for the 2006 General Election.

By checking this box, we are representing that our county **DOES** have security related incidents to report with the use of our voting equipment for the 2006 General Election and we will be attaching incident reports to this document.

Carol L. Kruse  
Authorized Signature

11/29/06  
Date

Carol L. Kruse  
Printed Name

**RECEIVED**

NOV 29 2006

ELECTIONS/LICENSING  
SECRETARY OF STATE

Montrose

**Tim Bishop**

---

**From:** John Gardner  
**Sent:** Saturday, December 16, 2006 7:42 PM  
**To:** Montrose County; 'drudy@co.montrose.co.us'  
**Cc:** Tim Bishop  
**Subject:** Security Plan Update - Notice C1  
**Attachments:** Security plan update request Montrose-notice c1.pdf

Attachment 14  
Incomplete Notice C1  
December 16, 2006

Carol, I am following up on your security plan. We still need to get these issues addressed and have not received a response from your office. Your County is out of compliance for the 2006 General Election. Please respond to our office as soon as possible. You can contact myself or Tim Bishop at (303) 894-2200 ext. 6324. If you believe that you are receiving this message due to an error in our records, please contact me within the next 2 business days so we can correct this error.

Thank you,  
John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 270  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

STATE OF COLORADO  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 270  
Denver, CO 80290



Gigi Dennis  
Secretary of State

Holly Z. Lowder  
Director, Elections Division

December 16, 2006

**PLAN ON FILE  
INCOMPLETE NOTICE**

HON CAROL L. KRUSE  
MONTROSE COUNTY CLERK  
320 SOUTH 1<sup>ST</sup> STREET  
MONTROSE CO 81402-1289

RE: Colorado County Security Procedures

Our office has received your submission of a security plan for the 2006 General Election prior to the October 20<sup>th</sup> deadline. Additionally, we have provided you with Notice A1 prior to October 30<sup>th</sup> indicating your plan was incomplete. The instructions you received were to resubmit your updated security plan to our office by November 1<sup>st</sup> or as soon as possible. Our records indicate you have not responded to this request and possible additional e-mail requests for information.

It is imperative to the assurance of elections integrity throughout the state that your security plan is updated and complete as soon as possible before the start of voting. In the event of an election challenge or a recount that affects your county or possibly statewide, the examination and evaluation of security measures put in place may be used to determine the integrity of electronic votes. Your county is currently out of compliance and a response is requested as soon as possible.

Security plans must be submitted to John Gardner ([john.gardner@sos.state.co.us](mailto:john.gardner@sos.state.co.us)) or to the fax number provided at the bottom of the form.

As always, we are available to assist you with any questions or concerns you may have regarding this process. Please contact John Gardner (303) 894 - 2200 x6318 or Tim Bishop (303) 894 - 2200 x6324, with any questions you have regarding your security plan.

Thank you for addressing this in preparation for Election Day.

John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 370  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

**Tim Bishop**

---

**From:** John Gardner (away from office) [john.gardner@sos.state.co.us]  
**Sent:** Monday, December 18, 2006 8:37 AM  
**To:** Tim Bishop  
**Subject:** FW: Security Plan Update - Notice C1

Fyl...  
John G.

---

**From:** Carol Kruse [mailto:ckruse@co.montrose.co.us]  
**Sent:** Monday, December 18, 2006 8:30 AM  
**To:** John Gardner  
**Subject:** Re: Security Plan Update - Notice C1

We are currently finishing up the elements that were deficient. You will receive it this week. n

Carol Kruse, Montrose County Clerk

----- Original Message -----

**From:** John Gardner  
**To:** Montrose County ; drudy@co.montrose.co.us  
**Cc:** Tim Bishop  
**Sent:** Saturday, December 16, 2006 7:42 PM  
**Subject:** Security Plan Update - Notice C1

Carol, I am following up on your security plan. We still need to get these issues addressed and have not received a response from your office. Your County is out of compliance for the 2006 General Election. Please respond to our office as soon as possible. You can contact myself or Tim Bishop at (303) 894-2200 ext. 6324. If you believe that you are receiving this message due to an error in our records, please contact me within the next 2 business days so we can correct this error.

Thank you,  
John Gardner  
Voting Systems Specialist  
Colorado Department of State  
1700 Broadway, Ste 270  
Denver, CO 80290  
Office: 303.894.2200 ext. 6318  
Fax: 303.869.4861

---

No virus found in this incoming message.  
Checked by AVG Free Edition.  
Version: 7.1.409 / Virus Database: 268.15.23/591 - Release Date: 12/17/2006

**STATE OF COLORADO**

**Department of State**

1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



**Gigi Dennis**  
Secretary of State

**Holly Z. Lowder**  
Director, Elections Division

December 27, 2006

Attachment 16  
Letter to Carol Kruse Requesting  
Information  
December 27, 2006

Carol Kruse  
Montrose County Clerk & Recorder  
320 S 1<sup>st</sup> Avenue  
Montrose, CO 81401-3907

Re: Request for Information

Dear Ms. Kruse:

The Secretary of State has received inquiries related to the 2006 General Election in Montrose. In response to these inquiries the Secretary has requested that documentation be collected for analysis by this office.

Section 1-1-107(2)(b), C.R.S., authorizes the Secretary of State "[t]o inspect, with or without the filing of a complaint by any person, and review the practices and procedures of county clerk and recorders, election commissioners, their employees, and other election officials in the conduct of primary, general, and congressional vacancy elections and the registration of electors in this state."

The Secretary of State requests that the Montrose County Clerk & Recorder's Office provide the following information:

- Electronic copies of all:
  - BOSS Databases used in the election
  - Ballot Now databases used in the election
  - Tally Databases used in the election
  - MBBs used in the election
  - CVRs for all machines, if used in both Early Voting and on Election Day.  
The information should be disclosed by machine serial number and both copies provided
- Copies of all:
  - JBC tape from the close of the polls at Early Voting and on Election Day
  - Ballot Now reports used for canvassing
  - Tally reports used for canvassing
  - Ballot Inventory Logs used at Early Voting and Polling Places for Election Day
- Reports from the Integrity system of "voter credit" issued for Absentee and Early Voting
- Copies of all pollbooks from Election Day
- Any other canvass reports and/or records used to certify the election results to the Secretary of State



I would appreciate receiving the requested information no later than the close of business on January 12, 2007. Based on the information provided to this office, the Secretary of State will determine whether further investigation may be warranted.

If you have questions regarding the information requested or need assistance in gathering the information please contact either John Gardner or Stephanie Cegielski at 303.894.2200, ext. 6318 or 6327, respectively.

Sincerely,

Holly Z. Lowder  
Director of Elections

cc: Robert J. Hill  
Montrose County Attorney  
161 S. Townsend Avenue  
Montrose, CO 81401-3955



**MONTROSE COUNTY**  
COLORADO

CLERK AND RECORDER'S OFFICE

Attachment 17  
Response from Carol Kruse  
January 4, 2007

**RECEIVED**

JAN 08 2007

ELECTIONS / LICENSING  
SECRETARY OF STATE

January 4, 2007

Dear Ms. Lowder,

In response to your letter of December 27, 2007, requesting information from the November 7, 2006 election, please be advised that Montrose County Clerk and Recorder's Office does not at this time have the staff, time or budget to provide the requested information in the time-line set by your office.

Our election department would be receptive to having a member of your staff come to Montrose and copy the requested information or audit same, at a time when it is convenient to do so. We ask that it would be after January 12<sup>th</sup>, deadline and with 48 hours notice, so that we could prepare a place for someone to work and also that we would be certain that all needed materials are assembled. One note, the databases can be provided on CD, except that to our knowledge there is no way to extract a copy of the MBB. We are consulting with HART about this matter.

I understand the importance of your request and want to assure you that it is critical that both the Secretary of State office and the County's Election Task Committee receive all the material we can provide to help the review process.

Again, I would respectfully request the State to conduct their review in our office where a more thorough, efficient and timely review could be conducted.

Yours truly,

Carol L. Kruse  
Montrose County Clerk

**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 29  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Test Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 99  
 Audit Log Entries: 752

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close



**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 3  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 1794  
 Audit Log Entries: 6657

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close



**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 5  
 Election Identification Number: 1063  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 187  
 Audit Log Entries: 191

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close



**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 2  
 Election Identification Number: 1066  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 25  
 Audit Log Entries: 180

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close





Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 9

Election Identification Number: 1068

Election Description: Official Ballot

Election Date: 11/07/2006

Election Mode: Election Mode

Cast Vote Records: 87

Audit Log Entries: 475

OK

Close

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.



Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 24

Election Identification Number: 1068

Election Description: Official Ballot

Election Date: 11/07/2006

Election Mode: Election Mode


Cast Vote Records: 246

Audit Log Entries: 1023

OK

Close

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.



Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 25

Election Identification Number: 1068

Election Description: Official Ballot

Election Date: 11/07/2006

Election Mode: Test Mode

Cast Vote Records: 0

Audit Log Entries: 57

OK

Close

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 13  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 343  
 Audit Log Entries: 1440

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close

**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 26  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 371  
 Audit Log Entries: 1204

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close

**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 10  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 649  
 Audit Log Entries: 2463

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close

**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 1  
 Election Identification Number: 1063  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Test Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 0  
 Audit Log Entries: 3

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close



**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 15  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 323  
 Audit Log Entries: 1411

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close



**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 14  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 428  
 Audit Log Entries: 1448

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close



**MBB Reset**

**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: 27  
 Election Identification Number: 1068  
 Election Description: Official Ballot  
 Election Date: 11/07/2006  
 Election Mode: Election Mode  
 Cast Vote Records: 421  
 Audit Log Entries: 1518

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close





**MBB Reset**

Warning: This dialog will clear the Audit and CVR logs of the MBB inserted into the ATA card reader.

MBB Identification Number: **1**  
Election Identification Number: **1064**  
Election Description: **Official Ballot**  
Election Date: **11/07/2006**  
Election Mode: **Test Mode**  
Cast/Vote Records: **0**  
Audit Log Entries: **3**

Select OK to reset the inserted MBB.

OK

Close





# Certifications

We do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true list of the registered electors voting at this Election.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

# Record of Assistance Given to Disabled Voters

Voter ID Number	Name of Voter Receiving Assistance	Name of Judges of Election or Elector Rendering Assistance	Facts Sworn to
7.03	Edna Morris	Connie Pittenger	
4.02	Clayton Thompson	Connie Pittenger	
4.02	Jeffrey Amato	Connie Pittenger	

We do hereby certify that the above is a true record of the assistance given Disabled Voters.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)



**POLLBOOK**

**PRECINCT: 3065843003**

**Path : Judges of Election      PRI      INCT:**  
**STATE OF COLORADO, COUNTY OF MONTROSE**

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am a citizen of the United States and the State of Colorado; that I am an eligible elector who resides in the county of MONTROSE or within the Political subdivision; that I am a member of the \_\_\_\_\_ Party (or that I am unaffiliated with a political party) as shown on the registration books of the county clerk and recorder; that I will perform the duties of judge according to law and the best of my ability; that I will studiously strive to prevent fraud, deceit, and abuse in conducting the same; that I will not try to determine how any elector voted, nor will I disclose how any elector voted if in the discharge of my duties as judge such knowledge shall come to me, unless called upon to disclose the same before some court of justice; that I have never been convicted of election fraud, any other election offense, or fraud and that, if any ballots are counted before the polls close on the date of the election, I will not

<u>Monte Koch</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Anna Lane Priest</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Heber B. Barnhill</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Joseph L. ...</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>J. W. ...</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>...</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>...</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)



# Certifications

We do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true list of the registered electors voting at this Election.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

## Record of Assistance Given to Disabled Voters

Voter ID Number	Name of Voter Receiving Assistance	Name of Judges of Election or Elector Rendering Assistance	Facts Sworn to
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

We do hereby certify that the above is a true record of the assistance given Disabled Voters.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

DMEA

Attachment 21  
Polling Location DMEA – Oath of  
Judges/Registration  
Verification/Certification

**POLLBOOK**

**PRECINCT: 3065843001**

1/18/21

DMEA





Certifications

We do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true list of the registered electors voting at this Election.

(Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_ (Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_ (Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_ (Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_

Record of Assistance Given to Disabled Voters

Voter ID Number	Name of Voter Receiving Assistance	Name of Judges of Election or Elector Rendering Assistance	Facts Sworn to

We do hereby certify that the above is a true record of the assistance given Disabled Voters.


(Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_ (Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_ (Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_ (Judge of Election - sign here) \_\_\_\_\_

# COUNTY OF MONTROSE POLLBOOK

PRECINCT: 5, 8, 10, 16

I, Carol L. Kruse do hereby certify that there are a total of 1672 registered voters in Combined Prec. 5, 8, 10 and 16 on this 3rd day of November, 2006

*Carol L. Kruse*  
*Montrose County Clerk & Recorder*



Attachment 22  
Polling Location NHF - Oath of  
Judges/Registration  
Verification/Certification

# Oath of Judges of Election

PR INCT: 5, 8, 10, 16

## STATE OF COLORADO, COUNTY OF MONTROSE

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am a citizen of the United States and the State of Colorado; that I am an eligible elector who resides in the county of MONTROSE or within the \_\_\_\_\_ Political Subdivision; that I am a member of the \_\_\_\_\_ Party (or that I am unaffiliated with a political party) as shown on the registration books of the county clerk and recorder; that I will perform the duties of judge according to law and the best of my ability; that I will studiously strive to prevent fraud, deceit, and abuse in conducting the same; that I will not try to determine how any elector voted, nor will I disclose how any elector voted if in the discharge of my duties as judge such knowledge shall come to me, unless called upon to disclose the same before some court of justice; that I have never been convicted of election fraud, any other election offense, or fraud and that, if any ballots are counted before the polls close on the date of the election, I will not

<u>James Eastman</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Marcy C. Moore</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Crystal Stephens</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Robert J. Williams</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Scotty [Signature]</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Therese J. Jester</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Daniel Heron</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Charles Barber</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Chelene Johnston</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Frank E. [Signature]</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Bradley J. Dillon</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>J. Ellen M. [Signature]</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Thomas Stockton</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)
<u>Chris [Signature]</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	<u>Zach Johnson</u> (Judge of Election - Sign here)	_____ (Judge of Election - Sign here)



**Certifications**

We do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true list of the registered electors voting at this Election.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

**Record of Assistance Given to Disabled Voters**

Voter ID Number	Name of Voter Receiving Assistance	Name of Judges of Election or Elector Rendering Assistance	Facts Sworn to
-----------------	------------------------------------	--	----------------

We do hereby certify that the above is a true record of the assistance given Disabled Voters.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Judge of Election - sign here)



Attachment 23  
Polling Location PAV – Oath of  
Judges/Registration  
Verification/Certification

**POLLBOOK**

**PRECINCT: 3065843014**





Certifications

We do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true list of the registered electors voting at this Election.

(Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here)  
(Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here)  
(Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here)

\*\*\*\*\*

Record of Assistance Given to Disabled Voters

Voter ID Number	Name of Voter Receiving Assistance	Name of Judges of Election or Elector Rendering Assistance	Facts Sworn to
-----------------	------------------------------------	--	----------------

We do hereby certify that the above is a true record of the assistance given Disabled Voters.

(Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here)  
(Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here)  
(Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here) (Judge of Election - sign here)

# SKIPPED CARDS

## SEAL LOG Chain of Custody

County **MONTGOMERY**

Device SN	Device Description	Signatures	Signatures
11-07	BAVING SAIL 8:50 PM	Handwritten Signature	Handwritten Signature
11-07	OPEN 8:30 AM	Handwritten Signature	Handwritten Signature
118107	TANCER 10:15 AM OPEN 10:40 AM	Handwritten Signature	Handwritten Signature

Attachment 24  
Secretary of State Chain of Custody  
Logs

If it is detected that the seal has been broken or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number of either a voting device, or a memory card or cartridge,  
CONTACT Clerk & Recorder at: \_\_\_\_\_

SEAL LOG  
Chain of Custody

County HARRIS

JBC-TATED

Device ID		Device Description		Signature	
Device ID	Seal ID	Device Description	Seal ID	Signature	Signature
1-12-07 08:22 AM	55004712	55004712	55004713	<u>JBC</u>	<u>JBC</u>
1-12-07 8:29 AM	55004712	55004712	55004715	<u>JBC</u>	<u>JBC</u>

If it is detected that the seal has been broken or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number of either a voting device, or a memory card or cartridge, CONTACT Clerk & Recorder at: \_\_\_\_\_



WARBOS -  
ST. GARD'S.  
ET.

SEAL LOG  
Chain of Custody

County MONROE

Device SN	Device Description	Serial	Signature
1207320	TRASH	55005494, 97, 98	
1/18/07 1445a	Open	55005496 - 98	<i>[Signature]</i>

If it is detected that the seal has been broken or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number of either a voting device, or a memory card or cartridge, CONTACT Clerk & Recorder at: \_\_\_\_\_

SEAL LOG  
Chain of Custody

County Montrose

FOLLBOEK BOX

COPIES OF FOLIOES

Device Description

Device SN

Device SN	Device Description	Device SN	Device SN	Signature
<u>11-07-18</u>	<u>SEAL LOG</u>	<u>55004703</u>	<u>55004703</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<u>11-07-18</u>	<u>SEAL LOG</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<u>11-07-18</u>	<u>TEAR SHEET</u>	<u>55004714</u>	<u>55004715</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<u>11-07-18</u>	<u>OPEN</u>	<u>55004714</u>	<u>55004715</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>

If it is detected that the seal has been broken or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number of either a voting device, or a memory card or cartridge, CONTACT Clerk & Recorder at: \_\_\_\_\_

SEAL LOG  
Chain of Custody

County SOS

ADULT ROOM - MONTROSE

Device SN	Device Description	5500 -	5426	5427	5428	5429	5478	5479	5480	5481	5482	5483	5484	5485	5486	5487	5488	5489	5490	5491	5492	5493	5494	5495	5496	5497	5498	5499	5500
123 7064a	Seal for Re-entry																												
123 7064a	Re-entry		5426	5427	5428	5429																							
123 515P	Seal for Re-entry		5487	5488	5489																								
124 8104a	Re-entry		5487	5488	5489																								
124 5100m	Seal for Re-entry		5483	5484	5485	5486																							
125 8105m	Re-entry		5483	5484	5485	5486																							
125 5100m	Seal for Re-entry		5479	5480	5481	5482																							
126 8104a	Re-entry		5479	5480	5481	5482																							
126 614m	Seal for Re-entry		5475	5476	5477	5478																							
127 1141m	Re-entry		5475	5476	5477	5478																							
127 210P	Seal for Re-entry		5471	5472	5473	5474																							
129 7127a	Re-entry		5471	5472	5473	5474																							
129 4116p	Seal for Re-entry		5467	5468	5469	5470																							
130 7135a	Re-entry		5467	5468	5469	5470																							
130 5136p	Seal for Re-entry		5463	5464	5465	5466																							
131 1015a	Re-entry		5463	5464	5465	5466																							

If it is detected that the seal has been broken or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number of either a voting device, or a memory card or cartridge, CONTACT: Clerk & Recorder at: \_\_\_\_\_

55005426

55005427

55005428

55005429

55005487

55005488

55005489

55005483

55005486

55005484

55005485

55005479

55005480

55005481

55005475

55005476

55005482

55005477

55005477

55005478

55005472


# Delivery of Pollbooks for Copying.

Attachment 25 - Photo Documentation of Sealed VVPAT, Incomplete Chain of Custody Logs, Direct Record Equipment, Other Findings, Canvass Documentation, Unsecured Tally Computer, Mobile Ballot Box Cards, Various Security Breaches







Signature Cards for voters who voted on various desks in Elections Office.





Signature Cards for voters who voted on Election Day were stored on various desks in Elections Office.



Examples of transferring blank V-VPAT records.





V-VPAT was sealed prior to zero verification. Would require a re-seal at voting location.

Voted V-VPAT records stored in DRE Case.



Transfer Case Chain of Custody  
 Logs – missing signatures  
 and/or illegible events.

Missing Signatures.





Equipment Storage – up to 6 locations for equipment storage, unable to verify all seals and/or serial numbers due to non-organization.



Room A



Room B




Room C

Equipment Storage – two different seals were used – chain of custody documentation missing.

Red Wire Seal.

Green Plastic Seal.



Red Wire Seal.

Green Plastic Seal.



Battery damaged unit sealed on sides, no seal on memory card slot as required.

Stored in separate room.






Various Storage Configurations  
– equipment with trash, against radiators, under windows – some with seals, some without. As many as 6 rooms used for storage.



Not - Sealed



Sealed



Other Document Storage –  
Alphabetized Absentee  
Application Envelopes, and  
Judge Supply Boxes.




Ballot Box – stored in vault (7<sup>th</sup> room for storage) with paper records (non-voted ballots).






# Delivery of Canvass (Poll Place Reconciliation Reports) documents to State Officials.



Discrepancy of documents provided for two different locations.



Reconciliation Report Complete (Left) and Incomplete (Right) – both used in the canvass of results.

**eSlate Reconciliation Log - Election Day**  
(This log should be attached to the eSlate Main Enclosure)  
 Complete one form per JBC

Election Reunion Polling Place Reunion Hall Date 11/7/06

**OPEN POLLS**  
 Initiate the form, and enter the Start of Day Public Count from the PUB COUNT on the JBC screen (bottom right hand corner, after PUB).

Lead Pollworker Initials MPW

Start of Day Public Count (from JBC) \_\_\_\_\_ (lower right corner of JBC screen)

**CLOSE POLLS**  
 Enter the End of Day Public Count from the PUB COUNT on the JBC screen (bottom right hand corner, after PUB). Using county records, enter the Number of Voters Checked In:

1. End of Day Public Count (from JBC) \_\_\_\_\_

2. Number of Voters Checked In \_\_\_\_\_ (lower right corner of JBC screen, including provisional)

**FROM ACCESS CODE REPORT/SUMMARY**  
 Enter the Number of Access Codes Issued, Voted, Expired, and Canceled from the Access Code (Summary) Report.

3. Number of Access Codes Issued 98 + 188 = 522

4. Number of Access Codes Voted 623 + 536 = 1159

5. Number of Access Codes Expired 90 +

6. Number of Access Codes Canceled 96 +

The Number of Voters Checked In and the Number of Access Codes Voted should match (lines 2 and 4). If they do not, please explain below in Comments.

Comments:  
584 JBC sig card  
567 paper ballot cards

Signature Schulte-Hoy Date 11/7/06

FL\_eSlateReconciliation Log\_ED\_rev1.0.06.doc

**eSlate Reconciliation Log - Election Day**  
(This log should be attached to the eSlate Main Enclosure)  
 Complete one form per JBC

Election general Polling Place Trinity Hall Date 11-07-06

**OPEN POLLS**  
 Initiate the form, and enter the Start of Day Public Count from the PUB COUNT on the JBC screen (bottom right hand corner, after PUB).

Lead Pollworker Initials Bob B. Juel

Start of Day Public Count (from JBC) \_\_\_\_\_ (lower right corner of JBC screen)

**CLOSE POLLS**  
 Enter the End of Day Public Count from the PUB COUNT on the JBC screen (bottom right hand corner, after PUB). Using county records, enter the Number of Voters Checked In:

1. End of Day Public Count (from JBC) 371 (2nd W 88)

2. Number of Voters Checked In + 37 = 408 (lower right corner of JBC screen, including provisionals)

**FROM ACCESS CODE REPORT/SUMMARY**  
 Enter the Number of Access Codes Issued, Voted, Expired, and Canceled from the Access Code (Summary) Report.

3. Number of Access Codes Issued 571 (2nd W 88)

4. Number of Access Codes Voted 571 (2nd W 88)

5. Number of Access Codes Expired 0 (2nd W 88)

6. Number of Access Codes Canceled 0 (2nd W 88)

The Number of Voters Checked In and the Number of Access Codes Voted should match (lines 2 and 4). If they do not, please explain below in Comments.



Comments:

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

FL\_eSlateReconciliation Log\_ED\_rev1.0.06.doc




Copies of JBC Tapes – many locations missing either Zero Tape, Summary Tape, Both or a middle section of the tape.



# Location and Access to Tally (results) computer.


Blank Password.



Adjacent to Public Entrance.



Access to Ports and Encryption Keys.



Delivery of MBB's to State Officials. Storage was not sealed or secured. TEN cards initially delivered as complete set. Databases listed 15 used for the election.






**MBB's were not labeled properly, and with various indications.**




**MBB's were labeled as Audio or Test but were storing voted ballots.**

Marked as Test.



Marked as Audio.







Final complete set of  
15 MBB's  
documented and  
verified after two days  
of searching by  
Montrose County  
Elections Department  
and accusations of  
State Officials  
deleting MBB Data.



**Sample DRE on Display for  
Public. Sealed with Election  
Day Reports on JBC.**



**Secured Access Door was left unlocked overnight. Room contains Memory Cards, Voted Ballots, Election Programming, Ballot Printing Equipment.**





**JBC's were stored in equipment space – some had memory card sealed, others did not have seals on memory card slot.**

**JBC passwords were either 122506 or 110706.**



Not Sealed

Sealed

